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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH
Case No. 981529-CA

Plaintiff/Appellant,

SAMUEL ENRICQUE BRACERO,
ARTURO RUIZ,
Defendants/Appellees.

Priority No. 2
:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The State appeals a final order of dismissal of charges against defendants for
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1 )(a)(iv) (Supp. 1998). Additional charges were dismissed
against defendant Bracero for driving on suspension, a class C misdemeanor, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227 (1998), and speeding, a class C misdemeanor, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46 (Supp. 1998).
These counts were dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the trial court's pre-trial
order suppressing evidence which rendered the State unable to proceed. See State v.
Troyer, 866 P.2d 528 (Utah 1993). The State's appeal is proper under Utah Code Ann. §
77-18a-l(2)(a) (1995 & Supp. 1998). This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND PRESERVED ON APPEAL,
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Whether defendants were lawfully detained at the time Trooper Metz requested
consent to search where a) neither defendant could lawfully drive the stopped vehicle, and
where b) the trooper reasonably suspected defendants were trafficking drugs based on the
strong odor of air freshener, ill-fitting moldings in the back seat area, defendant Ruiz's
history of drug smuggling and failure to make eye contact, and the recognized drug-route
location (1-15) of the stop.
2. Whether, assuming the detention was justified, the consent to search was
untainted.

A "bifurcated" review standard applies to these issues. The trial court's underlying
fact findings are reviewed deferentially, and reversed only for "clear error." The trial
court's conclusions of law, however, are reviewed for correctness, allowing some
"measure of discretion" as regards the application of legal standards to the facts. See
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994).
These issues were preserved below (R. 44-37, 75-71, 86-83, 97-96, 152-150).1

*The record is numbered in reverse chronological order. The cover page of the
suppression hearing transcript is numbered "160." The subsequent pages retain their
original numbering. Therefore, pages of that transcript will be numbered in this brief as
"R. 160:[internal pager number]." While there is one transcript, there are two separate
pleadings volumes pertaining to each defendant. Because the pleadings are duplicative,
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants were charged with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1998).
Additionally, defendant Bracero was charged with driving on suspension, a class C
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227 (1998), and speeding, a class C
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46 (Supp. 1998).
Defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to a warrantless search
(R. 16-15, 15-27) (a copy is contained in addendum A). The State opposed the motion
(R. 44-37) (a copy is contained in addendum B). Following an evidentiary hearing on 12
January 1998 (R. 160) (a copy of the transcript is contained in addendum C), the trial
court granted defendants' motions (R. 75-71) (a copy of the Ruling is contained in
addendum D).
The State filed an objection and motion to reconsider arguing that the detention
and search were also justified as incident to defendant Bracero's arrest (R. 78, 80, 86-83)
(a copy is contained in addendum E). Defendants filed an opposing memorandum
arguing that the search occurred prior to the arrest and therefore was not justified under
the search incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement (R. 94-90) (a copy is
contained in addendum F). The trial court summarily denied the motion to reconsider (R.

for the sake of convenience, the State cites solely to the pleadings volume pertinent to
defendant Bracero.
3

97-96) (a copy is contained in addendum G). Written Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law were entered on 14 August 1998 (R. 152-150) (A copy is contained in addendum
H). Because the State was unable to proceed without the suppressed evidence, the trial
court dismissed all charges with prejudice (R. 157-156). The State filed a timely notice
of appeal (R. 159-58).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On 14 November 1997, police found 31 pounds of marijuana, separated into 17
different packages and wrapped in duct tape, behind ill-fitting plastic panels in the rear
seat area of defendants' 1989 Ford Tempo.
Trooper Metz stopped the Tempo for speeding on 1-15 in Juab County, Utah (R.
160: 6-10), add. C. As the trooper approached the Tempo, he observed that the back seat
did not appear secure and that the molding in that area was not properly fitted (R. 160: 11,
23), add. C. Particularly, there was a gap in the plastic below the rear passenger window
(R. 160: 11,28), add. C.
In talking with the driver, defendant Bracero, Trooper Metz detected a strong odor
of air freshener (R. 160: 14), add. C. In Trooper Metz's experience "heavily perfumed
odors of fresheners" are often used to mask the odor of illicit drugs (R. 160: 14), add. C.
Both Bracero and his passenger, defendant Ruiz, were nervous (R. 160: 14), add. C. Ruiz
kept his head down, and would not look up, even when the trooper asked for his
identification (R. 160: 14), add. C. Trooper Metz suspected defendants might be
4

trafficking narcotics (R. 160: 14), add. C.
As the traffic stop progressed, Trooper Metz learned that neither defendant was the
registered owner of the Tempo (R. 160: 15), add. C. Bracero had a California Driver's
License, but Ruiz had only a citizenship document (id). These facts added to the
trooper's suspicion: "In my experience in dealing with individuals with contraband, a lot
of times the vehicle is not registered in the driver's name nor is any of the occupants the
registered owner of the vehicle" (R. 160: 16), add. C.
The trooper also became concerned that the Tempo was potentially stolen: "I don't
take it for granted when people tell me they are borrowing a vehicle. I usually run a
warrants check, and check the vehicle and make sure it's not stolen" (id.).
While the Tempo was not reported stolen and was properly registered, the warrants
check also revealed that Bracero's driver's license was suspended and that both
defendants had criminal histories (R. 160: 17-18), add. C. Bracero had charges for,
among other things, weapons and alien smuggling (id.). Ruiz had a history of drug
smuggling (id.). While the trooper was running the warrants check, Bracero got out of
the Tempo and began anxiously walking towards the patrol car (R. 160: 18), add. C.
Trooper Metz asked Bracero to return to the Tempo until the computer checks were
complete (id.).
Once the checks were completed, Trooper Metz had Bracero join him in the patrol
vehicle (id.). Bracero acted surprised upon learning that his license was suspended (id.).
5

He also claimed to have known Ruiz for only three months and that he knew nothing
about Ruiz's involvement in drug smuggling (R. 160: 19), add. C. When Trooper Metz
asked Bracero if there was any contraband in the Tempo, Bracero invited the trooper to
search (R. 160: 20), add. C. Trooper Metz confirmed that invitation by specifically
requesting consent to search, which Bracero granted (R. 160: 19-20), add. C.
Trooper Metz first approached the front passenger side and asked Ruiz to step out
of the Tempo (R. 160: 21), add. C. Ruiz did so, still refusing to make eye contact with
the trooper (id.). Ruiz admitted that he had been previously arrested for drug smuggling
at the border (R. 160: 21), add. C. He denied having any weapons (id.).
In searching the vehicle, Trooper Metz found two receipts in the car door
indicating defendants had been in Tiajuana, Mexico (id.). He also found tools, including
screwdrivers in the glove box (R. 160: 24), add. C.
Bracero opened the trunk and the trooper continued his search in that area (R. 160:
22, 47), add. C. Trooper Metz observed that Bracero became increasingly nervous (R.
160: 22-23), add. C. Concerned for his safety, Trooper Metz hand-cuffed Bracero (R.
160: 23), add. C. Continuing with the search, the trooper noted that he could look right
through the trunk to the rear seat (id.). When he put his hand on the rear seat it lifted right
up (R. 160: 24), add. C. The trooper also noticed that the screws on the rear side panels
were marred as if they had been removed and replaced (id.). Using a screwdriver
retrieved from the glove box, the trooper unscrewed the plastic panels and behind the
6

insulation, found several packages wrapped in duct tape and smelling of raw marijuana
(id). Ultimately, 17 packages of marijuana weighing approximately 31 pounds were
seized (R. 43), add. B.
Both defendants testified at the suppression hearing. Bracero testified that
defendants were traveling from California to Idaho, that Trooper Metz first asked him if
he was Mexican, that he only walked toward the trooper's vehicle because Trooper Metz
motioned him to do so, that Trooper Metz did not request consent to search and that he
(Bracero) did not open the trunk, but that Trooper Metz "popped" the trunk using an
electric switch inside the glove compartment (R. 160: 54), add. C. Bracero claimed that
Trooper Metz searched the trunk after completing the warrants checks (R. 160: 79), add.
C.
Ruiz testified similarly, claiming that Trooper Metz first searched the trunk, before
asking him to exit the Tempo (R. 160: 88), add. C.
On rebuttal, Trooper Metz denied asking either defendant his nationality,
reaffirmed that Bracero invited him to search the Tempo and that he clarified that
invitation with Bracero by asking for consent (R. 160: 91), add. C.
Motion to Suppress. Defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized claiming
that the stop and detention were improper (R. 16-15, 25-17), add. A. Defendants also
disputed that Bracero consented to the vehicle search (R. 60-59) (a copy of defendants
written closing argument is also contained in addendum A).
7

The State responded that the detention was proper based on the facts that neither
defendant was the registered owner of the Tempo, and that neither was legally authorized
to drive (R. 39), add. B. These facts, together with the trooper's observations of the illfitting molding, the strong smell of air freshener emanating from the vehicle, the
defendants' criminal histories (including Ruiz's prior arrest for drug smuggling), and the
trooper's observations of a cell phone and maps in the console area, gave rise to a
reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking (R. 39-38), add. B. The State further argued that
Bracero gave voluntary consent to search (R. 38-37), add. B.
Ruling. The trial court found that the stop was objectively valid based on the clear
speeding violation, and "discounted] defendants claim that the stop was racially
motivated or that the defendants had been stopped because they fit some sort of profile"
(R. 70), add. D.2
However, the trial court agreed with defendants that the scope of the detention was
unjustified.3 Finding the detention improper, the trial court declined to further address the
validity of the consent to search (R. 68), add. D.

2

At the close of the evidentiary hearing held on 12 January 1998, defendants
conceded the validity of the traffic stop based on the speeding violation (R. 160: 94), add.
C. However, in a subsequently submitted "Closing Argument," defendants attacked the
stop as pretextual (R. 69-58), add. A.
3

While the trial court ruled in favor of the defendants, he made clear that he did not
"adopt" defense arguments impugning the integrity of the officers involved (R. 72), add.
D.
8

Motion to Reconsider Ruling. The State filed a motion to reconsider the
suppression ruling, arguing that Trooper Metz could have arrested Bracero based on the
suspended driver's license and that the search was therefore justifiable as incident-toarrest (R. 80, 86-83), add. E. Defendants responded that the search was not justifiable on
that ground because the trooper began his search in the trunk of the car, and because
defendants were not arrested until after contraband was discovered therein (R. 94-90),
add. F. The trial court summarily denied the State's reconsideration motion (R. 94), add.
G.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Thereafter, written Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law were entered (R. 147-145), add. H. The trial court found that
defendants were stopped for speeding, that Trooper Metz "detected a strong odor of air
fresheners and could see the air freshener on the console,'1 that defendants were traveling
from California to Idaho, that defendants had criminal histories and that Ruiz had been
arrested for drug smuggling, that Bracero's license was suspended and that Ruiz could not
legally drive, that defendants were nervous and would not make eye contact with the
trooper, that the trooper obtained consent to search, and that ultimately 17 packages of
marijuana each weighing approximately 31 pounds were recovered from behind the illfitting side panels and moldings the trooper had described (R. 152-151), add. H.
Notwithstanding thesefindings,the trial court ultimately concluded that
defendants were unjustifiably detained when the trooper requested consent to search. In
9

that regard, the trial court further ruled that:
A.

Trooper Metz could not have seen the map or cell phone when he
looked in the car since they were located between the seat and
console of the car. The map nor cell phone would not by themselves
be evidence of criminal activity.

B.

Trooper Metz explained that the molding in the rear part of
the car appeared altered. On cross-examination, however, he
could not explain which panels were gapped and did not seem
to be properly attached. Thus his recollection of the event
was too tenuous upon which to base a continued detention.
Ill-fitting molding would not by itself be evidence of criminal
activity.

C.

An out-of state car headed to Idaho does not, by itself,
evidence criminal activity.

D.

The nervousness of the defendants does not justify further
detention nor, by itself, is it evidence of criminal activity.

E.

The air freshener smell does not justify further detention. The smell
of air freshener, by itself, does not evidence criminal activity.

F.

The fact that neither occupant of the vehicle was the registered
owner does not warrant a detention beyond that of traffic stop nor by
itself does it evidence criminal activity.

(R. 151-150), add. H.
Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that the trooper lacked
reasonable suspicion to detain defendants (R. 150), add. H. Thus, while the trooper had
obtained consent to search, the search was tainted by the illegal detention (id.) On that
ground, the trial court granted the motion to suppress (id.).

10

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The State does not dispute the trial court's findings and conclusions that the initial
traffic stop was valid and that defendants consented to the warrantless vehicle search.
Nor does the State dispute the trial court's factual findings regarding the information
available to Trooper Metz at the time he requested consent to search. The State does
dispute, however, the trial court's ultimate conclusion drawn from these findings, that
defendants were improperly detained by the request for consent to search.
Indeed, the trial court's factual findings support the contrary conclusion that the
detention was legitimate a) because the trooper had a legitimate traffic related purpose in
detaining defendants where neither defendant was in apparent lawful possession of the
Tempo and neither could lawfully drive the car away, and/or b) the trooper reasonably
suspected defendants involvement in drug trafficking.
Regarding the latter justification, the trial court specifically found that the trooper
detected a strong odor of air freshener, that defendants had criminal histories including
Ruiz's history of drug smuggling, that the trooper observed ill-fitting molding near the
back seat of the Tempo, and that defendants were nervous and refused to make eye
contact with the trooper. Additionally, it is undisputed that the stop occurred on a known
drug-route (1-15). The trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to find these facts
taken as a whole established reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking.
Nor was it disputed that neither defendant was the registered owner of the Tempo
11

and that neither defendant was legally authorized to drive.
The trial court's failure to recognize that the detention was justified, either as a
continuing traffic detention, or on grounds of reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking, is
driven by its failure to consider the totality of the circumstances. Instead, the trial court
improperly viewed the facts in isolation, concluding that each was independently
inadequate to support the detention. The trial court's erroneous conclusion that further
detention was unlawful also contravened controlling Fourth Amendment authority.
Because defendants were lawfully detained beyond the purpose of the initial
speeding stop, the State further disputes the trial court's conclusion that the subsequent
consent to search was tainted by the ongoing detention. It was on this erroneous ground
that the evidence was ultimately suppressed.
The trial court's erroneous suppression ruling should be overturned and the
information reinstated.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S SUPPRESSION RULING IS
INCONSISTENT WITH ITS FACTUAL FINDINGS,
FAILS TO CONSIDER THE TOTALITY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES, AND CONTRAVENES
CONTROLLING AUTHORITY

The trial court's erroneous ruling suppressing the evidence seized is driven by its
failure to properly consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the detention
and its misapprehension of controlling Fourth Amendment authority. As a consequence,
12

the trial court's ultimate legal conclusions are inconsistent with, and unsupported by its
factual findings. The suppression ruling therefore "exceeds established legal boundaries"
and merits no measure of discretion. See State v. Strausberg, 895 P.2d 831, 835 N.5
(Utah App. 1995); State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922, 929 (Utah App. 1994) (both
evaluating custody determinations and observing that such "fact sensitive" determinations
by a trial court are accorded a "measure of discretion," unless the determination "exceeds
established legal boundaries").
A.

Defendants Were Lawfully Detained Beyond Purposes of
the Initial Speeding Violation When it Was Discovered
that Neither Defendant Was Legally Authorized to Drive
and Neither Defendant Was the Registered Vehicle Owner

Despite having found that neither defendant was legally authorized to drive, and
that neither defendant was the registered vehicle owner, the trial court concluded that
defendants were improperly detained beyond the initial traffic purpose of the stop
(speeding) when Trooper Metz requested consent to search (R. 150), add. C. In so ruling,
the trial court implicitly rejected the prosecutor's argument that the detention was
properly ongoing due to these additional concerns (R. 39), add. B and (R. 85-83), add. E.
It is well established that an officer conducting a routine traffic stop, as in this
case, Mmay request a driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check,
and issue a citation." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994). A driver so
detained is free to proceed on his way only after having produced a 'Valid driver's license

13

and evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle[.]ff Id. (quotation omitted). It necessarily
follows that defendants here were properly detained on the grounds that neither had
produced a valid driver's license (Bracero's license was suspended, and Ruiz produced
none), nor clear evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, where neither was the
registered owner. Id. Although the Tempo was not reported as stolen, the possibility
remained that the car was so recently stolen as not to have yet been reported to NCIC.
See State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 436 (Utah App. 1990) (recognizing that where
vehicle had not been reported stolen, police could attempt to verify defendants permissive
use of the vehicle with registered owners "within in a reasonable time'1); State v. Dickey,
706 A.2d 180, 186 (N.J. 1998) (where registered owner not immediately found, it was
reasonable to pursue possibility of stolen vehicle "for a period of time,'1 but two hour
detention was unreasonable).
Moreover, Bracero, the driver, was subject to arrest for driving on suspension, see
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227 (1998) and State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1201-04 (Utah
1995) (driving on suspension is an arrestable offense). Since Ruiz, the passenger was
neither the registered owner, nor legally authorized to drive, the Tempo was likely to be
impounded. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-l 101 (Supp. 1998) (authorizing impoundment
of vehicles reasonably suspected stolen and/or abandoned). Therefore, the mere request
for consent to search for contraband did not detain defendants longer than would have
been necessary to resolve and/or further investigate these additional concerns, even
14

beyond the initial speeding violation.
Further, precisely because the request for consent to search did not detain
defendant's beyond these additional and legitimate concerns, no independent justification
was required for the request. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 ("Investigative questioning that
further detains the driver must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious
criminal activity.") (emphasis added).
In sum, the facts that neither defendant could lawfully drive the Tempo, and that
neither defendant was the registered owner, are part and parcel of the initial traffic stop
for speeding. These matters arose as the trooper lawfully proceeded with the speeding
violation and necessarily required defendants' further detention, regardless of the
trooper's request for consent to search. The request for consent to search thus engendered
no improper detention, and required no additional justification. In concluding otherwise,
the trial court erred as a matter of law. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132.4

4

The State asserted below that the search was also justified as incident-to-arrest
based on Bracero's suspended license which gave the trooper objective grounds to arrest
before contraband was discovered in the Tempo (R. 80, 86-81), add. E (discussing
Harmon). The trial court summarily rejected this argument without making any findings
whether the search began in the trunk, as claimed by defendants (R. 160: 88), or in the
passenger area, as the trooper testified (R. 160: 40). See United States v. Belton 453 U.S.
455, 460 n.4 (1981) (excluding trunk from scope of permissible searches incident-toarrest). The State does not concede this argument, but for purposes of analysis on appeal,
submits that its "no improper detention" analysis presents a clearer ground for reversal.
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B.

The Detention Was Also Justified by a Reasonable
Suspicion of Drug Trafficking Based on the Strong Odor
of Air Freshener, Ruiz's History of Drug Smuggling and
Refusal to Make Eye Contact, the Ill-Fitting Moldings,
and the Drug-Route Location (1-15) of the Stop

Even assuming that defendants were detained beyond legitimate traffic purposes
by the trooper's request for consent to search, that detention was justified by his
reasonable suspicion of other criminality. The trial court found that Trooper Metz
"detected a strong odor of air fresheners and could see air freshener on the console"; that
both defendants had criminal histories and that Ruiz had a history of drug smuggling; that
neither defendant was the registered owner of the Tempo; that Bracero's driver's license
was suspended and that Ruiz was not legally authorized to drive; and that both defendants
were nervous and refused to make eye contact with the trooper (R. 152-151), add. H.
While the trial court also found that the trooper was unable to explain which panels were
gapped and improperly attached, he did not find that Trooper Metz could not have made
this observation (R. 151), add. H. As far as they go, these findings are essentially
correct.5
These factual findings also establish reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking. Of

5

The trial court found that defendants were traveling from California to Idaho, but
failed to recognize that they were stopped on 1-15, a recognized drug route. See State v.
Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 534 n.l (Utah 1994) (recognizing "[t]he fact that Interstate 15 is an
established route for illegal drug trafficking").
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particular significance are the undisputed facts that Trooper Metz detected the strong odor
of air freshener, a recognized masking agent, and that Ruiz had a history of drug
smuggling. See United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 57 F.3d 895, 898 (10th Cir. 1995)
(reasonable suspicion established based on use of masking agent, and computer hit
indicating that defendant had previously been referred to Customs for "zero tolerance,
drugs"); United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 362 (10th Cir. 1989) (reasonable suspicion
established based on use of recognized masking agent, and DEA computer indication that
defendant was involved in a drug trafficking).
The confluence of these two factors, together with the recognized drug-route
location of the stop, the gapped molding in the back seat area, defendants' refusal to make
eye contact, and the fact that neither defendant was the registered owner of the Tempo,
establish at least reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking as a matter of law. In State v.
Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 534 (Utah 1994), the supreme court reviewed a similar 1-15 traffic
stop turned drug investigation and found that an experienced officer's observation of a
"false bed" in the stopped truck, tools to secure the false bed in the cab area, and the
defendants' extreme nervousness, all properly contributed to the higher standard of
probable cause for a warrantless search. Therefore, the instant facts necessarily properly
contribute to the lower threshold of reasonable suspicion. See United States v. VillaChaparro, 115 F.3d 797, 802-803 (10th Cir.) (observation of soap crystals, odor of
detergent, and fact that defendant was not registered owner of vehicle all contributed to
17

reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking), cert denied, Villa-Chaparro v. United States,
U.S.

, 118 S.Ct. 326 (1997); United States v. Mendez, 118 F.3d 1426,1432 (10th

Cir.1997) (acknowledging that "[disassembled interiors, scratched paint, missing screws
or other signs that a vehicle's paneling or natural configuration has been altered often lead
law enforcement officers to the discovery of contraband," and finding that observation of
dislocated dash and dismounted radio, along with defendant's vague travel plans
constituted reasonable suspicion); United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir.
1986) (drugs found behind loose quarter panel); United States v. Sanchez, 866 F. Supp.
1542, 1554 (D. Kan. 1994) (coffee smell and suspect's travel on a known drug route (I70) among factors contributing to reasonable suspicion); State v. Guzman, 879 P.2d 114,
116 (N.M. App.) (strong odor of air freshener together with defendant's nervousness
constituted reasonable suspicion for further investigation), cert, denied, 484 P.2d 1174
(N.M. 1994); State v. Cabanas, 594 So.2d 404, 409 (La. App. 1991) (defendant's
inability to identify registered owner, nervousness, evasive responses as to his destination
and strong odor of fabric softener constituted reasonable suspicion); State v. Thompson,
543 So.2d 1077, 1080 (La. App.) (defendant's nervous behavior and smell of air
freshener in the back of truck where sealed boxes were located justified further
detention), writ denied, 551 So.2d 1335 (La. 1989).
Based on the above, Trooper Metz's suspicion of drug trafficking was eminently
reasonable.
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C.

The Trial Court Erred as A Matter of Law in Failing to
Consider the Totality of the Circumstances

Despite the essentially undisputed facts, the trial court nonetheless erroneously
concluded that Trooper Metz lacked either a traffic related, or a more serious criminal
purpose, to detain defendants (R. 150), add. H.
This erroneous conclusion is largely driven by the trial court's erroneous analysis
of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop. Rather than viewing the facts as
whole, the trial court parsed out particular facts, finding that viewed in isolation, each
failed to support the trooper's suspicion of drug trafficking (R. 151-150), add. H. The
trial court separately focused on the gapped molding, strong odor of air freshener,
defendants' travel route, nervousness, and the fact that neither defendant was the
registered vehicle owner, and found that viewed in isolation, these facts were not
independently indicative of criminal activity (id). In summarily denying the State's
motion to reconsider (R. 39), add. E, the trial court also implicitly rejected the fact that
neither defendant could lawfully drive the Tempo as a ground to detain at least defendant
Bracero, who was driving on a suspended license.6 Because none of the above facts

6

The trial court rejected the trooper's observations of a map and cell phone,
concluding that trooper could not have observed these items when he first approached
defendants (R. 151), add. H. The only evidence contravening the trooper's testimony was
a videotape shot from outside the vehicle looking into the interior, made some time after
the traffic stop (R. 160: 30), add. C, (Defendant's Exh # 7). The trooper testified the
videotape did not accurately reflect the "angle" of his observations when the stop was
made (R. 160: 32), add. C. Therefore, the State disputes the trial court's findings in this
19

standing alone would establish reasonable suspicion, the trial court ultimately concluded
that any detention beyond the traffic purpose of the stop was unjustified (R. 150), add. H.
Contrary to the trial court's erroneous analysis, M[a court] must consider 'the
totality of the circumstances-the whole picture[,]"f to evaluate the validity of a detention
based on reasonable suspicion. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989) (quoting
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). While any one of the above facts
would not by itself necessarily support a reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking, when
properly considered together, they amount to such as a matter of law. Sokolow, 490 U.S.
at 9; see also Reidv. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (per curiam) (recognizing "there
could, of course, be circumstances in which wholly lawful conduct might justify the
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot'1). Precisely because Trooper Metz was not
dependent solely on one or the other of these facts, the trial court's failure to properly
consider all relevant facts is especially egregious.
Factors establishing the reasonable suspicion calculus are simply not properly
viewed in isolation, but must be seen as part of the "totality of the circumstances facing
the officer at the time of the stop." State v. Shepard, 955 P.2d 352, 355 (Utah 1998). To
do otherwise is error.

regard. However, because reasonable suspicion is otherwise established as a matter of
law, these facts are not determinative of the issue here.
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D.

The Trial Court Misapprehended State v. Humphrey

The trial court's erroneous conclusion regarding the validity of the trooper's
criminal investigation was also based on a misapprehension of State v. Humphrey, 937
P.2d 137 (Utah App. 1997). Defendants cited Humphrey below for the proposition that a
suspect's criminal history ffis not properly part of'theprobable cause determination" (R.
62) (quoting Humphrey, 937 P.2d at 142) (emphasis added)). While it may be debatable
whether criminal history contributes to a finding of probable cause to conduct a
warrantless search,7 Humphrey clarifies that criminal history is a factor in determining
reasonable suspicion. 937 P.2d at 143. Because this case involves reasonable suspicion,
rather than the more demanding standard of probable cause, Humphrey is not supportive
of the trial court's suppression ruling. Based on Humphrey, the trial court erred as a
matter of law in refusing to consider defendants' criminal history, particularly Ruiz's
compelling history of drug smuggling, see Part B, supra, in determining reasonable
suspicion to detain.
In sum, the trial court's findings that the trooper detected a strong odor of air
freshener and observed gapped molding in the back seat area, that Ruiz had a history of

1

Compare Humphrey, 937 P.2d at 142 (criminal history not considered) with State
v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1204, 1206 (Utah 1984); State v. Lee, 863 P.2d 49, 56 (Utah
App. 1993); State v. Buford, 820 P.2d 1381, 1385 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Stromberg,
783 P.2d 54, 55 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990) (all
affirmatively recognizing that criminal history contributed to probable cause
determination).
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drug smuggling and consistently refused to make eye contact with the trooper, together
with the undisputed fact that the stop occurred on a known drug-route, establish the
reasonableness of the trooper's suspicions of drug trafficking. Because the trial court
failed to properly consider the totality of these circumstances, and also misapprehended
controlling Fourth Amendment authority, it failed to give these facts proper weight. The
trial court's ruling suppressing evidence therefore exceeds legal boundaries and should be
reversed.
II.

ANY DETENTION WAS JUSTIFIED; THEREFORE,
DEFENDANTS CONSENT TO SEARCH IS
UNTAINTED

The trial court found that although the trooper obtained Bracero's consent to
search the Tempo, any consent was tainted by the illegal detention. Thus, assuming the
validity of the detention, the reasonable inference from the trial court's ruling is that the
warrantless search was justified by the defendants' consent. Ohio v. Robinette,

U.S.

, 117 S.Ct. 417, 421 (1996); State v. Contrel, 886 P.2d 107, 111 (Utah App. 1994),
cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995).
While defendants disputed whether Trooper Metz ever asked for consent to search,
(R. 60-59), add. A, the trial court found that defendants consented to the search (R. 160:
19-21), add. C, (R.151 ), add. H. Trooper Metz claimed no authority to search, nor was
the consent obtained by a show of force or by deception or trick (R. 160: 19-21), add. C.
And, defendants were cooperative (id.). See State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106
22

(Utah 1980) (setting forth factors evaluating consent to search including absence of a
show of authority or force, deception or trick, and the presence of a mere request and
cooperation by the owner).8 Therefore, assuming this Court finds the detention valid,
there is no need to remand for findings on the validity of the otherwise untainted and
voluntary consent.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the Court should reverse the trial court's suppression of
evidence and reinstate the information.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on ijMay 1999.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

MARIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General

8

The State argued that the consent to search was voluntarily given below (R. 38),
add. B (discussing Whittenback factors).
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Addendum A

Jere Reneer (7967)
HUNT & RENEER, P.C.
275 North Main
PO Box 298
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660
(801) 798-3574
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, CITY OF OREM DEPARTMENT
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plainth%

I vs.
SAMUEL BRACERO,
Case Nos.9714000222 & 9714000223

|

and
Judge:

ARTURO RUIZ,
Defendants.

COMES NOW, the above named defendants, by and through their attorney of record, Jere
//
//

Reneer of HUNT & RENEER, P.C, and moves the court to suppress the evidence gathered on

1

I

their arrest of November 14, 1997. The basis for the motion is more fiilly set forth in the
accompanying memorandum of points and authorities.
Dated this < 3 / *

day of\QpM/tfjfy?

. 19fZ.

mm

& RENEER, p.c.

Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO
SUPPRESS, postage prepaid, on the <3I

day of/OC/1.

, 19 "77

JUAB COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
146 N. Main
Nephi, UT 84648

Secretary
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, to the following:

Jere Reneer (7967)
HUNT & RENEER, PC.
275 North Main
PO Box 298
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660
(801) 798-3574
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ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT C OURT FOR UTAH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, CITY C•F OREM DEPARTMENT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

1

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

vs.
Case Nos.9714000222 & 9714000223

SAMUEL BRACERO,
and
ARTURO RUIZ,

Judge:
Defendants.

j

COMES NOW, the above named defendants, by and through their attorney of record,
Jere Reneer of HUNT & RENEER, P.C., and moves the Court to suppress the evidence
gathered on their arrest of November 14, 1997. Defendants assert that the officers herein
made an unconstitutional arrest, detention and search of the defendants in violation of the
rights guaranteed them under Article I, Section 14, of the Utah State Constitution and the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
STATEMENT OP FACTS
1.

On the morning of November 14, 1997, just after 9:00 a.m., the defendants were

traveling north bound on 1-15 south of Nephi. Mr. Bracero was driving and noticed a
1

Utah Highway Patrol Car on the side of the road up ahead on the uphill grade he was
pulling south of the city of Nephi. He glanced at his speedometer, which only goes up to
80 mph, to make sure he was not violating the speed limit. Mr. Bracero's speedometer
read 73 mph.
2.

Officer Metz was in the Highway Patrol car ahead of defendants on 1-15 and

reported a radar reading on the defendants car of 82 mph. The Defendants are of Latin
decent and their vehicle, a brown Ford Tempo, has California license plates.
3.

Officer Metz pulled out behind defendants car as they passed. Mr. Bracero made

sure to keep his speed below the posted maximum, frequently checking his speedometer.
Officer Metz continued to follow the defendants for several minutes and miles, finally
pulling defendants over.
4.

Officer Metz made contact with Mr. Bracero, informing him that he had been

stopped for speeding and asked for his license and registration. Mr. Bracero protested
the speeding accusation, but quickly provided a California drivers license and California
registration.
5.

Defendants had a cellular phone and maps in the console area of the car, observed

by Officer Metz. Officer Metz reports that the back seat and side panels appeared loose
and dirty and that he could smell airfreshenerstrongly in defendants vehicle.
6.

Officer Metz asked the passenger, Mr. Ruiz, for identification and he provided his

US certificate of Citizenship. Metz asked where they were headed, to which Bracero
replied, "Idaho Falls, to see a friend."

2

7.

Officer Metz returned to his car to request information about the defendants form

dispatch. Mr. Bracero was watching Officer Metz in his rear view mirror and saw him
make a motion which Bracero took to mean that the Officer wanted him to come back to
the patrol car. After Bracero exited his vehicle, Officer Metz motioned for him to stop
and go back to his vehicle.
8.

Officer Metz received the criminal history of both defendants. Mr. Ruiz has a

prior drug conviction in California, and Mr. Bracero has an Assault and larceny charge on
his record. Defendants had no outstanding warrants.
9.

Mr. Bracero had not made it back to his vehicle when Officer Metz got out of the

patrol car and approached Bracero. Metz informed him that his license was suspended,
of which Bracero was not aware. Metz asked him about his criminal record, to which
Bracero responded candidly. Metz then informed Bracero of Mr. Ruiz's prior drug
offense and asked how long he had known him. Bracero replied he had known Mr. Ruiz
for three months.
10.

Officer Metz told Bracero he thought there were drugs in the car. Metz asked

Bracero if there were any drugs or weapons in the car. Bracero replied that there were
not. Metz then told Bracero to put his hands behind his back, informing him that he was
not under arrest, but merely detaining him so he would not run.
11.

Mr. Ruiz, still in the passenger seat looking ahead, heard the hand cuffs click and

turned to look out the back window to see Bracero cuffed. Officer Metz then told
Bracero he was going to search the car. Bracero did not respond.

3

12.

Officer Metz removed the keys from defendants car and brought them back to the

trunk to attempt to open it. The key turnedfreelyin the cylinder without releasing the
trunk latch.
13.

Officer Metz approached Mr. Ruiz and asked, "how many pounds do you have this

time." Metz then put the key in the ignition and had Ruiz open the glove box to release
the trunk latch with the button located there.
14.

Bracero, cuffed on the side of the car, and Ruiz watching through the rear and side

windows of the car, watched as Officer Metz went through the contents of the trunk.
Three unopened bottles of beer, clothing and personal items, were found in the bags that
belonged to Bracero. A large bag was identified by Bracero as belonging to Ruiz.
15.

Officer Metz took the Ruiz's bag to the front of the car and had Ruiz exit the

vehicle to the front of the car and went through the bag. No contraband was found.
16.

Officer Metz then searched the glove box. He found food items, a couple screw

drivers, brake fluid, spray cleaner, and cassette tapes. Metz then removed the back seat,
finding nothing, he probed the side panels by removing a plastic cover where an optional
ashtray could be installed, sticking his arm in the hole. He found nothing.
17.

Officer Paul Mangleson arrived at the scene. Defendants both watched as

Mangleson tapped the outside of defendants vehicle with his fist in the passenger area.
Feeling something, Mangleson again removed the covers on the passenger panels and
reaching through felt a bag. The panels were then removed completely, marijuana could
now be smelled. Approximately 31 pounds of marijuana were found behind the panels of
defendants car.
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18.

Ruiz was then placed in cuffs and both defendants were read their Miranda

warning.
19.

Mangleson told Metz he could take credit for thefindand left the scene.
STATEMENT OF LAW
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the "right of

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures...." U.S. CONST, amend. IV. In Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648,
653 (1979), the United States Supreme Court held that "stopping an automobile and
detaining its occupants constitutes a seizure within the meaning of [the Fourth
Amendment], even thought the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention
is quite brief. Accord State v. Talbot. 792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(Fourth
Amendment rights apply to traffic stops "regardless of the reason for the stop or the
brevity of the detention"). An officer, however, is constitutionally justified is stopping a
vehicle if the stop is "incident to a traffic violation committed in the officer's presence."
Talbot. 792 P. 2d at 491. But, the length and scope of the detention must be "strictly tied
to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." State v.
Johnson. 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991)(quoting Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.
Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968); accord State v. Hansen. 193 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 28 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992).
ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENDANTS WERE ILLEGALLY DETAINED BECAUSE OF THEIR
RACE AND OUT OF STATE LICENSE PLATES.

5

Defendants were going up a steep grade on the outskirts of Nephi, Utah, in a 1989
four cylinder Ford Tempo when they observed a Highway Patrol car up ahead. The
speedometer only goes up to 80 mph, and defendant immediately looked at the
speedometer upon seeing the officer and noted his speed to be less than the posted
maximum.
Officer Metz, rather than pulling the defendants over immediately, followed them
for several miles and only after so observing them, pulled them over. He accused them of
going 82 mph. A speed that defendants contend is unattainable by their vehicle while
going up the grade south of Nephi.
Defendant asserts that Officer Metz unjustly detained defendants by pulling them
over because of their race and California license plates. Profiling them pretextually as
drug dealers and pulling them over on the chance defendants might have drugs.
Officer Metz, not having actually witnessed a traffic violation, therefore violated
defendants constitutional rights when he pulled them over, and all evidence later seized
must be suppressed and the defendants released.
H.
DEFENDANTS WERE ILLEGALLY DETAINED BEYOND THE INITIAL
PURPOSE OF THE TRAFFIC STOP.
Assuming arguendo, that Officer Metz did make a valid traffic stop of defendants
for speeding, the evidence seized was illegally obtained because defendants were detained
beyond the scope of such a stop.
Utah courts have determined than "an officer conducting a routine traffic stop may
request a driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a

6

citation." State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431,435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); accord Statey,
Johnson. 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991). The officer may also check for outstanding
warrants "so long as it does not significantly extend the period of detention." State v.
Figueroa-Solorio. 830 P.2d 276,280 (Utah App. 1992). Once, however, the occupants of
the vehicle have satisfied the reasons for the initial stop, the officer must permit them to
proceed. See State v. Lovesren. 829 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). "Any further
temporary detention for investigative questioning after the fulfillment of the purpose for
the initial traffic stop is justified under the fourth amendment only if the detaining officer
has a reasonable suspicion of serious criminal activity." Robinson. 797 P.2d at 435;
accord Hansen. 193 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28. Furthermore, the detaining officer must be
able to articulate a particularized and objective basis for their suspicions that is drawn
from a totality of the circumstances facing them at the time of seizure. United States v.
Cortez. 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed. 2d 621 (1981); see State v.
Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987).
In the present case, the officer requested license, registration, and identification
from the defendants, which they provided. He also conducted a computer check of the
defendant's records. At that point the officer had satisfied all the reasons for the initial
stop and should have cited Bracero and sent them on their way. Instead, the officer,
aware only of defendant's prior criminal history, and particularly Ruiz's prior drug
conviction, asked Bracero if drugs were present in the car and requested consent to search
defendant's vehicle. Absent a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the
officer had no authority to make such inquiries. Utah's Court of Appeals recently
7

addressed what facts may not be the basis of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
The court stated that "the fact an individual previously has been involved in criminal
activity is not enough. We recognize that consideration of an individual's past criminal
history is not properly part of the probable cause determination." State v. Humphrey. 937
P.2d 137, 142 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

8

Because knowledge of criminal history cannot be used for probable cause
determinations, no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity can be articulated, and any
request by the officer to search the vehicle is unjustified and beyond the scope of the initial
stop. Defendant contends he did not give consent to search his vehicle, however, whether
consent to search from defendants was obtained or not is moot. The very questioning by
the officer was illegal of itself.
Observations by the officer that he smelled airfreshenerand saw a cell phone,
maps and loose panels and seats in the rear of the car are disputed facts and irrelevant, as
even if true would not rise to the level of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
CONCLUSION
Because the officer's request to search defendants' vehicle and the subsequent
detention were unlawful, all evidence discovered should be suppressed.
DATED this

3 1 ^

day o f ^ / ^ f e /

, 19<?7

.

HUNT & RENEER, P.C.
JerJ^Serteer ^^^^
Attorney for Defendants
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Jere Reneer (7967)
HUNT & RENEER, P.C.
275 North Main
PO Box 298
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660
(801) 798-3574
FX (801) 798-3576
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ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT FOR JUAB COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

CLOSING ARGUMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
SAMUEL BRACERO,
Case Nos.9714000222 & 9714000223
and
ARTURO RUIZ,

Judge: . ^ K d ^ ' / g ' U S )

Defendants.

COMES NOW, the above named defendants, by and through their attorney of
record, Jere Reneer of HUNT & RENEER, P.C, and asks the court to suppress the
evidence gathered on their arrest of November 14, 1997, and submits closing argument in
support thereof. Defendants assert that the officers herein made an unconstitutional
arrest, detention and search of the defendants in violation of the rights guaranteed them
Under Article I, Section 14, of the Utah State Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.

then descends to the north towards NephL This last section of the grade is also the
steepest part of a long rise in elevation over several miles. Even a car with a powerful
motor requires a lot of throttle to make this long grade at over 80 miles an hour.
Defendant Bracero testified that he saw Officer Metz's patrol car several hundred
yards ahead at mile marker 217 and quickly glanced at his speedometer, which only reads
up to 80 mph, and it read between 75 and 77 mph. Bracero immediately slowed the car to
between 70 and 73.
While Bracero admits he was violating the speed limit, the question must be asked,
who gets pulled over for going 1, or even 2 miles over the speed limit? In the territory of
Officer Mangelsen and his crew, including Officer Metz, Hispanics with out of state plates
traveling north on 1-15 do. However, because a 1 or 2 mph violation might look a little
suspicious, possibly exposing the unwritten policy, the Officer might as well make it a 7
mph violation. The fact is Metz had no intention of pulling defendants over for violating
the speed limit by 2 mph, until he saw them pass his patrol car, saw the color of their skin
and their California license plate.
Metz canned testimony regarding calibration of his radar gun and his experience
with its use, as well as his account of "gunning" the defendants vehicle, could be given in
his sleep. Such testimony is exactly the same for every disputed speeding ticket and Metz
has probably given it dozens of times. For this reason this testimony is probably not
probative in this matter in light of the totality of the facts.
After this pretextual stop, the first words out of Metz mouth were, "are you
Mexican," not, "can I see a license and registration. And then to the passenger in Spanish,
3
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"Mexicano?" What could nationality possibly have to do with speeding? The answer is
nothing, but then, the defendants were not pulled over for speeding.
H.
OFFICER METZ GAVE NO BELIEVABLE ACCOUNT OF HIS
REASONABLE SUSPICION SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY EXCEEDING THE
SCOPE OF THE INITIAL DETENTION.
The prosecution goes to great length in their Memorandum in Opposition to show
how light the standard Officer Metz must meet to reach a determination of reasonable
suspicion sufficient to detain defendants beyond the scope of a traffic stop. And, rightly
so, since even if Metz is to be believed, the evidence is skimpy.
A cell phone, air freshener, some maps, a dirty back seat, loose panels and valid
registration is not much to go on since all this evidence is common to thousands who drive
along the highways of Utah. Of course, adding that the defendants are Hispanic, have
California license plates, criminal records (no warrants outstanding), and were acting
nervous, then under the auspices of the "unwritten policy," there might be reasonable
suspicion. However, nothing in this second category of evidence can be used as a basis
for reasonable suspicion, as will be shown infra.
Additionally, many of the observations Metz claims he used to reach his
assessment of reasonable suspicion, just could not have been discovered in the way he
claims. No matter how slight the standard for reasonable suspicion, you cannot meet the
standard with fabricated facts.
a.
OFFICER METZ'S STATED GROUNDS FOR REASONABLE
SUSPICION ARE INSUFFICIENT AND COULD NOT HAVE BEEN
DISCOVERED AS HE CLAIMS.

4

Cell phones, airfresheners,and maps in a car heading in any direction on an inter
state highway is so common as can hardly be pointed to as a basis for reasonable suspicion
of anything other than traveling in a car. The equivalent of saying there was gas in the fuel
tank. Only after illegal drugs or paraphernalia are seen or smelled in a suspects car, does
this evidence then acquire significance in the totality of the circumstances.
Of more interest concerning this evidence, is that Officer Metz stated
unequivocally on cross examination that he did not notice these items until he was directly
beside the driver, looking in the drivers side window. Metz stated further that seeing the
cell phone, maps and smelling the airfreshener,he started to be suspicious of the
defendants. However, as the video and pictures entered into evidence clearly indicate,
Metz could not have seen these itemsfromhis position at the driver's window. Testimony
of all concerned placed the maps, cell phone and airfreshener(a single, several week old
canister with little scent left) in the center console under or to the side of the emergency
brake lever. Even without anybody in the car, you cannot see what is in the console from
that window, let alone with a grown man sitting in the seat. Not until after Metz had
illegally searched the defendant's vehicle did he go back and use the then readily available
evidence to bolster his story.
Officer Metz was even more confused in his testimony concerning the allegedly
loose and dirty panels in the rear of defendant's car. Metz suggested that as he
approached the car, looking through the back and driver's side rear window, he could see
the rear inside passenger panel was loose, making him very suspicious of drugs being
concealed there. Metz further claimed that the "several pieces" of the panels had gaps
5

where they came together and they were dirty, as if they had been taken apart. Whether
the seat and panels were dirty or not is about as relevant as maps being in the car. But,
gaps in the panels could be probative.
Counsel for the defense tried at length to have Officer Metz explain exactly where
these gaps were, to no avail. Metz could not explain where the gaps were, because there
were not any. In fact, the panel Officer Metz had referred to is actually one solid piece
that encompasses the entire rear side window, making it impossible to show "gaps." The
only gap Metz could have seen would be the gap for the automatic seatbelt track, that is
part of the design of the car and is only visible from the front side of the door post of the
car, not from the rear window or rear side window.
After illegally finding marijuana behind the side panels of the defendants car, Metz
must have decided that a story about gaps in the panels would be a plausible way to
bolster his report of reasonable suspicion to ask for consent to search or probable cause to
search, but the facts do not bear him out.
One must also wonder why, if Metz was so suspicious of the panels in the rear
passenger area of defendant's car, did he search the trunk first? No matter whose version
of events is accepted, Metz searched the trunk of the car first. In fact, the very last place
Metz searched was the rear passenger panels and back seat, and then, only after Sgt.
Mangelsen arrived on the scene to help with the previously initiated search. It was
Mangelsen who probed the exterior of the car with his fist, pounding on the outer panels
to 6¥eel" for packages possibly contained within. It was Mangelsen who went to his car
and retrieved a screw driver to remove the panels from the inside. And it was Mangelsen
6

who pulled out the packages of marijuana from the car. All of this took place after more
than 30 minutes of searching by Officer Metz which revealed nothing illegal or supporting
of reasonable suspicion.
Another incongruity in Metz testimony centers on his procedure for dealing with a
suspended license violation. Metz testified that normal procedure for a suspended license,
is to write a ticket for the violation and let the driver go. Even if he was reluctant to let a
driver leave on a suspended license, when a passenger is present in the suspended drivers
car, they could take over the driving duty. If Metz was concerned about letting Bracero
drive on a suspended license, why not ask the passenger if he had a valid license and let
them on their way. Metz testified he never asked Mr. Ruiz this simple question. Instead,
Metz cuffed Mr. Bracero, and illegally asked him if there were drugs in the car, then
proceeded to search the car.
Defendants were not detained for the reasonable purpose of dealing with a
suspended license, but rather so Metz could try and confirm his unreasonable suspicion of
criminal activity by illegally questioning defendants beyond the scope of the initial stop and
searching their vehicle.
Prosecution also offers the fact that the car was not registered to the driver, yet it
was validly registered and was not reported stolen. Defendants told Metz at the scene of
the illegal search and by testimony under oath that the vehicle belonged to a friend. No
evidence exists to refute this assertion. A validly registered car gives rise to no suspicion,
reasonable or otherwise, in the totality of circumstances or otherwise.
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Not until after the marijuana was found did Metz develop a story that would justify
his actions, using his knowledge of search and seizure law to pick the facts that would best
supportfindingdrugs in the rear panels.
b.
METZ FURTHER DEVELOPED HIS ALLEGED REASONABLE
SUSPICION IN VIOLATION OF ESTABLISHED CASE LAW AND BY
UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS.
Metz focus on the nationality of the defendants, which is completely irrelevant to
any purpose of the initial stop, lets his true motivation for searching defendants shine
through. The impropriety of such motivation is well established, as is the use of California
plates as a basis for reasonable suspicion, without further argument.
Furthermore, Metz specifically admitted under cross examination that he used the
criminal history of defendants tofindprobable cause to search for drugs, in direct
contravention of Utah case law. Utah's court of Appeals recently stated, "the fact an
individual previously has been involved in criminal activity is not enough. We recognize
that consideration of an individual's past criminal history is not properly part of the
probable cause determination." State v. Humphrey. 937 P.2d 137, 142 (Utah Ct. App.
1997).
Metz testified that he approached Mr. Bracero, who had stepped out of the Ford
Tempo, after he had run a records check on the defendants. Counsel for defense asked
Metz, ccYou then told Samuel (Bracero) that Arturo (Ruiz) had a drug conviction and that
it made you believe there was contraband in the vehicle? Is that correct?" Metz answered
emphatically, "yes."
Metz under direct examination, seemed anxious to reveal that dispatch also
8

mentioned the word "compartment" when giving Mr. Ruiz's criminal history. I am at a
loss as to what that means or how it is relevant, and so was Metz, because he could give
no further testimony on how that specific word could be part of anybody's criminal record
or how it could heighten his suspicions.
Metz also testified that defendants seemed nervous during his encounter with them
and that Mr. Ruiz avoided eye contact with him when Metz initially questioned him. Metz
further testified that this nervous conduct heightened his suspicions of criminal conduct by
the defendants. Again, Metz use of this observation as a basis of reasonable suspicion
directly violates established case law in the state of Utah. State v. BaumgarteL 762 P.2d
2, 4 (Utah App. 1988)("... acting in a nervous manner in the presence of police is not
sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is involved in criminal
conduct."); State v. Trujillo. 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1986)(Nervous conduct is
consistent with innocent as well as criminal behavior).
Officer Metz denied using defendants race as a basis for his reasonable suspicion to
detain and search defendants, but his actions tell a different story. Metz did, however
admit to noticing the California license plates on defendant's vehicle as they past his
position on 1-15; did admit using defendant's criminal history to establish reasonable
suspicion; and did admit that defendant's nervous conduct was used for reasonable
suspicion; and in the process highlighted how the '"unwritten policy" actually works. Look
for out of state plates with Hispanics driving, check for criminal history and search the car.
Then, if any contraband is found, tailor the facts to justify the detention and if no probable
cause can be shown to search the vehicle, then claim consent was given.
9

EL
DEFENDANTS NEVER GAVE CONSENT TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE
THEY WERE DRIVING.
Whether defendants gave consent or not is somewhat moot, as Metz had no
reasonable suspicion to justify detaining defendants to ask for consent to begin with.
However, assuming arguendo, that Metz could detain defendants for questioning about
drugs, factual discrepancies in the account given by Metz in procuring consent, and the
defendant's testimony, combined with physical evidence, cast further doubt on Metz
credibility in this matter.
Officer Metz claims that Mr. Bracero stepped out of his car and approached him
while he was doing a record check on the defendants and their vehicle. Metz next testified
that he asked Mr. Bracero about his relationship to Mr. Ruiz, asked about their criminal
history, and then asked Mr. Bracero if he could search the car. Metz testified that Mr.
Bracero gave consent to search. Metz further testified that he then had Mr. Bracero get
the keys to the car, open the trunk and help him go through the contents of the trunk.
Only after searching the trunk, Metz testified, did he place Mr. Bracero in hand cuffs, not
because he was under arrest, but for both of their protection.
There are several problems with this account. According to the testimony of Mr.
Bracero, after Metz spoke with him about the defendants criminal histories, Metz told Mr.
Bracero that he thought there was contraband in the vehicle and he was going to search
the car. Metz then placed Mr. Bracero in hand cuffs, the closing sound of which alerted
Mr. Ruiz who was still sitting in the passenger seat of the vehicle. Mr. Ruiz watched the
hand cuffing through the back window of the car, something he would not have been able
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to do if the trunk was open from a search prior to Metz cuffing of Mr. Bracero, as Metz
claims.
Metz testimony was further refuted by a showing on video and by defendants'
testimony, that the trunk of the vehicle could not be opened with the key by anyone, let
alone a handcuffed Mr. Bracero. The only way the trunk will open is by popping the
lever in the glove box, which Metz instructed Mr. Ruiz to do, while Mr. Bracero remained
cuffed behind the vehicle.
On cross examination concerning the opening of the trunk, Metz again appeared
confused and unable to give a straight answer. Only on rebuttal, after listening to
testimony about the trunk lock from both defendants and watching the video, did Metz
feebly try to straighten out his story.
CONCLUSION
For every critical factual juncture of the search and arrest of defendants, Officer
Metz gave testimony that was confused, self-serving, impossible, or when forthright and
accurate, only showed his biased predisposition toward defendants.
The bottom line is that defendants, were driving an out of state car, are Hispanic
and were pulled over for it. When the defendants showed prior criminal history, Metz, in
accordance with an unwritten, yet well known policy of Utah Highway Patrolmen in the
ambit of Paul Mangelsen, decided to search the car and did so.
Metz could not possibly have seen the cell phone, maps or gaps in the panels when
or as he claims. These things were either not in Metz view at the times he claims to have
used them for reasonable suspicion, or they did not exists ever. However, after the search
11

all the evidence Metz claimed to have seen upfront,was available for use in the
fabrication of an arguably plausible basis for reasonable suspicion. Even if we accept Metz
account, there is no legal basis for the reasonable suspicion Metz provided that would
justify detaining defendants to ask about drugs or for consent to search their vehicle.
Possibly sensing how weak this fabricated story might seem, Metz threw in another
fabrication about defendants consent to search their vehicle. Metz simply does not present
a believable story against the accounts of the two defendants and the available physical
evidence, and therefore defendants pray the court to suppress all evidence against them
and release them from custody forthwith.
DATED this

2»

day of February, 1998.

<fe^
Jer^Keneer
Attorney for Defendants
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David O. Leavitt, No. 5990
Juab County Attorney
146 North Main
Nephi, Utah 84648
Telephone: (435) 623-1141
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,
vs.

Criminal No. 9714000222
9714000223

SAMUEL ENRIQUE BRACERO and
ARTURO RUIZ
Defendants.
The State of Utah hereby submits the following Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion to Suppress.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 14,1997, Trooper Hoby Metz of the Utah Highway Patrol, within Juab
County, Utah, stopped a 1989 Ford Tempo for speeding, 82 m.p.h. in a 75 m.p.h. zone. The
driver of the vehicle was Samuel Enrique Bracero. Arturo Ruiz was a passenger in the vehicle.
Trooper Metz approached the driver and informed him why he had stopped him and asked for a
driver's license and registration. Trooper Metz smelled a strong odor of air freshener and could
1

see the airfresheneron the console. He also observed a cellular phone and two maps in the
console area. The driver spoke good English. Trooper Metz observed that the interior of the
vehicle behind the driver and passenger appeared to have been taken apart. All of the plastic
moldings had gaps between them and they appeared to be dirty. The rear seat did not appear to
be tightly in place and it was dirty as well. The passenger appeared to be very nervous and
would not make eye contact with the officer. Also the driver was becoming nervous. Trooper
Metz became suspicious that the occupants may be transporting controlled substances. Also the
registered owner was not in the vehicle. Trooper Metz returned to his patrol car and requested
criminal histories on the two occupants of the vehicle. The histories came back with the driver
having been arrested for assault, weapons, larceny, fraud and a recent arrest for alien smuggling.
The passenger had been arrested for possession, sale and furnishing of marijuana/hash. Trooper
Metz then approached the driver and told him what he had found out and asked for permission to
search the vehicle. The driver gave him permission to search. A search of the vehicle revealed
17 packages of marijuana weighing approximately 31 pounds.
ARGUMENT
1. Trooper Metz legally stopped the defendant.
Trooper Metz stopped the defendant's vehicle for speeding 82 m.p.h. in a 75 m.p.h. zone.
"A peace officer is constitutionally justified in stopping a vehicle if the stop is 'incident to a
traffic violation committed in the officer's presence."' State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, (Utah,
1994) quoting State v Talhot, 792 P.2d 489 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990). For that reason, the
2

State believes that Sergeant Mangelson was completely justified in stopping the defendant's
vehicle.
1. The officer lawfully exceeded the scope of the original detention.
a. The standard for proving reasonable suspicion is less than probable cause.
The test for reasonable suspicion when an officer makes an investigative stop is: "where
an officer observes unusual conduct which reasonably leads him to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot a brief investigative stop and detention to dispel
the officer's suspicion or prevent criminal activity is justified. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,22, 30
(1968)(emphasis added). As the term "may" implies, an officer's on-the-spot determination of
whether there is reasonable suspicion to support an investigative stop requires a weighing of
probabilities:
"The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the
law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain commonsense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as fact finders are permitted to do the
same-and so are law enforcement officers."
UnitedJStatesv, Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989)(quoting United States v.
Cortes, 449 U.S. 411,418 (1981)).
Officers do not have unbridled discretion to stop and detain citizens but should articulate
some basis for doing so that is "more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch."
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7,109 S. Ct. At 1585 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Yet the standard for establishing the officer's reasonable suspicion has a low threshold of
proof as stated best by the U.S. Supreme Court:
The Fourth Amendment requires "some minimal objective justification" for making the
stop. That level of suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a
preponderance of the evidence. We have held that probable cause means "a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found," and the level of
suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than probable cause . . .
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7, 109 S. Ct. At 1585 (citations and some internal quotation marks omitted)
(emphasis added). Accord Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884.
The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized the lower standard of proof needed to
establish reasonable suspicion. In State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989), the defendant, who
had been stopped and questioned by an officer, argued that his initial detention was unsupported
by probable cause. Id. At 650. The Supreme Court did not accept the defendant's argument but
instead, relying upon Terry and its own post-Terry case law, upon held the stop on the less strict,
reasonable suspicion standard: "We have held that a brief investigatory stop of an individual by
police officers is permissible when the officers have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective
facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity." Bruce, 779 P.2d at 650 (quoting
authorities; internal quotations omitted).
The Court of Appeals has stated that reasonable suspicion "must be based on objective
facts suggesting that the individual may be involved in criminal activity." State v. Menke, 787
P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 1990).
Both Bruce and Menke comport with the fourth amendment's "minimal objective
4

justification" standard set forth in Sokolow. The Sokolow standard recognizes that limited, nonarrest detention serves not merely to apprehend criminals, but also to dispel suspicion and
prevent criminal activity. E.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. At 1880 (limited detentions
supported by interest in "effective crime prevention and detection"). That definition
contemplates the very real likelihood that many such detentions will reveal no criminal evidence.
That likelihood, however, does not erode the validity of acting upon facts that, at the moment in
question, would warrant a person of "reasonable caution" in taking action. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22,
88 S.Ct. At 1880.
In evaluating the validity of an investigative stop or detention, a court must consider "
'the totality of the circumstances-the whole picture.'" Sokolow, 490 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). See
also State v. Strick1ing3 844 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah App. 1992). Accordingly, "dissecting the facts
that confronted [the officer]" and [looking] at each fact in isolation.. .is not proper." Strickling,
844 P.2d at 983.
There may also have been wholly innocent explanations and alternative inferences to be
drawn from every one of the factors confronting the officer. That, however, has never been a
proper basis for ruling that an investigative detention was invalid:
We said in Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 100 S. Ct. 2752,[](1980)(per curiam), "there
could, of course, be circumstances in which wholly lawful conduct might justify the
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.".. .Indeed, Terry [v. Ohio] itself involved "a
series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent" if viewed separately, "but which taken
together warranted further investigation." 392 U.S., at 22, 88 S. Ct., at 1881.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 15 9-10,109 S. Ct. At 1586-87.
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Utah courts have also recognized that potentially innocent behavior may nonetheless give
rise to reasonable suspicion. In State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725, 727-28 (Utah App. 1992), the
defendant argued that "all of the factors justifying reasonable suspicion listed by the [officers]
[we]re consistent with innocent behavior and thus, [could not] amount to reasonable suspicion."
This Court rejected that argument and held that "[t]he trial court's findings of fact show that a
reasonable person would conclude that Chapman had violated the [law]." Id. At 728 (footnote
omitted).
Similarly, in Menke, the court held that the behavior of an individual outside a shopping
mall, "although conceivably consistent with innocent-albeit highly eccentric-activity," were
nevertheless also consistent with shoplifting. 787 P.2d at 541. Therefore, the detention of that
individual by the observing officer was deemed reasonable. Id*
b. Reasonable suspicion to continue the detention in this case.
By applying the reasonable suspicion standard as set forth above, the Court should
conclude that Trooper Metz had reasonable suspicion to suspect that more serious criminal
activity was a foot thus allowing the continued detention. First, the defendant was not in
apparent lawful possession of the vehicle. This fact alone is grounds to continue the detainment
beyond that of a mere traffic stop. Since the officer had no idea if the defendant legally
possessed the vehicle. Second, the back seat and the molding around the back seat appeared
altered or moved. This lead Trooper Metz to believe that the automobile had been dismantled to
smuggle drugs. Third, when Trooper Metz noticed a cellular phone, and two maps in the console
6

area. Trooper Metz smelled the strong odor of airfreshenerhis suspicions were correctly
heightened. Fourth, the fact that the passenger showed a prior arrest for a drug violation also
added strength to his detention.
2. Consent search.
a. Trooper Metz received voluntary consent to search the automobile.
State v, Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah, 1990) sets forth that the determination of whether
consent is voluntarily given by the defendant "depends on the totality of all the surrounding
circumstances-both the characteristics of the accused and the details of police conduct." The
Utah State Supreme Court in State v. Wittenback, sets forth factors which may show a lack of
duress or coercion. Such include 10 The absence of a claim of authority to search by the officer;
2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4)
cooperation by the owner of the vehicle; 5) the absence of deception or trick on the part of the
officer. See State v. Wittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah, 1980). In this case the officer did not
claim to have authority to search the vehicle. He showed no force but simply requested to search
the vehicle. The defendant said "go ahead" to Trooper Metz's request to search the vehicle.
Wittenback sets forth that the State is not required to prove that the defendant knew of his right
to refuse to consent in order to show voluntariness.
b. There is no exploitation of a prior illegality.
State v. Arroyo, requires that two prongs be present for a search to fit within the contest
of a consent search. First, the consent must be voluntary. Second, the consent must not be
7

obtained through police exploitation of a prior or antecedent police illegality. The Supreme
Court state in Arroyo "that voluntary consent, as defined for Fourth Amendment purposes is an
intervening act free of police exploitation of the primary illegality and is sufficiently
distinguishable from the primary illegality to purge to evidence from the primary taint" Arroyo.
In this case, there is no prior illegality since the officer had reasonable suspicion to continue the
detainment beyond that of a mere traffic stop. The police officer did not need reasonable
suspicion that drugs were in the vehicle; he needed reasonable suspicion, he may legally ask
consent to search. If the consent is voluntary, the search is legal. Such is the case here.
CONCLUSIONS
For the reasons set forth above, the State respectfully requests that the Court deny the
defendant's Motion to Suppress.
Dated this

Clf<lL day of January, 1998.

c-Havrd O. Leavi
Juab County Attorney
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion to Suppress to Jere Reneer, Attorney for Defendants, 275 North Main, P. O. Box 298,
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 on this j?7t/L day of January, 1998.

BY ( j/f
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NEPHI, UTAH; JANUARY 12, 1998; A.M. SESSION
THE COURT:

This is in the matter of State of

Utah against Samuel Bracero and State of Utah versus
Arturo Ruiz.

I take it each counsel -- if you'll note

your appearances, please.
MR. RENEER:

Jere Reener and Jefferson Hunt

for the defendants.
MR. LEAVITT:

David Leavitt for the State of

Utah.
THE COURT:

This is before the court for a

suppression hearing.
Which one of you is Samuel Bracero?
MR. BRACERO:
THE COURT:

I am, your Honor.
Thank you.

And do you speak >

English?
MR. BRACERO:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.
You don't feel you need an

interpreter?
MR. BRACERO:
THE COURT:

No, sir.
I take it, then, sir, you are

Arturo Ruiz?
MR. RUIZ:
THE COURT:
MR. RUIZ:
THE COURT:

Yes.
Do you speak English?
A little, sir.
And would you like to have an

NORA S. WORTHEN, RPR, CSR
(828) 652-0318
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interpreter?
MR. RUIZ:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Do we have chairs for

these men to sit back by counsel?

I'm going to ask

that you step down.
Before you sit down, Mr. Anderson, let's have
you sworn.
(Grant Anderson was sworn by the clerk to
interpret Spanish into English and English into
Spanish.)
THE COURT:

Thank you.

This is the time set

for a suppression hearing.
Mr. Leavitt, is the State prepared to
proceed?
MR. LEAVITT:

State is prepared to proceed,

your Honor.
THE COURT:

Mr. Reneer, you're ready as well?

MR. RENEER:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT:

You may call the witnesses you'd

like to call, Mr. Leavitt.
MR. LEAVITT:

Prior to beginning, your Honor,

I believe that it's appropriate to address one issue.
The defense has served upon Trooper Metz, the State's
witness in this case, a subpoena to examine his
traffic citation log for one week prior to the stop in

NORA S. WORTHEN, RPR, CSR

(828) 652-0318
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this case and one week after the stop in this case.
instructed him to have them here today.

I

I'm not sure

what the relevance is for -MR. RENEER:

Your Honor, we'll waive that and

just proceed.
MR. LEAVITT:
giving them to him.

We don't have any problems
We just would need to go get them

if they want to see them before the hearing.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

We'll go ahead and

proceed.
MR. LEAVITT:

Thank you.

We'll call Trooper

Hoby Metz to the stand.
HOBY METZ,
called as a witness by the State, was duly sworn
and testified as follows:
THE CLERK:

You do solemnly swear the

testimony you shall give in the case now pending
before the court will be the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:
THE WITNESS:

I do.
Please be seated, sir.
Thank you.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. LEAVITT:
Q

Please tell us your name.

NORA S. WORTHEN, RPR, CSR
(828) 652-0318
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A

My name is Hoby Norman Metz.

Q

Mr. Metz, what is your occupation?

A

I'm a state trooper for the State of Utah.

Q

And how long have you been a state trooper?

A

Five and a half years.

Q

On the 14th of November of 1997, did you have

occasion to come in contact with the defendants in
this case?
A

I did.

Q

Can you tell me where that occurred?

A

It occurred on 1-15.

I was in the median.

Had a vehicle pass my location at approximately mile
marker 217.
Q

And did you form the belief that the car was

speeding?
A

Yes.

Q

What did you base that opinion on?

A

Traffic was light.

very frequent.
came across.

Traffic --

Cars weren't coming over

I was down in the median.
I released my radar beam.

The vehicle
Clocked a

brown, compact vehicle at -- I believe a Ford at the
time -- I believed it to be a Ford -- 82 miles an hour
in a 75-mile-an-hour zone.
Q

Now, are you certified through the Highway

Patrol to operate a radar device?
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A

I am.

Q

On the 14th of November of 1997, was your

certification current?
A

Yes, it was.

Q

Had you done the internal calibrations

necessary to determine whether the machine was
operating properly on the date of the 14th of
November?
A

Prior to operating my radar unit to enforce

speed laws, I used tuning forks prior to setting up my
radar system and using it that day, that's correct.
Q

Now, do you also achieve a visual

certification for speed estimation in the Highway
Patrol?
A

Yes.

Q

Could you please describe what that is?

A

We're trained first to observe a vehicle.

We're also expected to gage the speed of vehicles
within 5 miles an hour.

And after we observe a

vehicle speeding, then we release our radar beam.
works on the Doppler system; emits a tone.

It

The tone

reaches a higher speed as the speed of a vehicle would
increase.

And then we can lock that speed on radar

and then we're trained to look at the speed after
we've locked it on.
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1
2

Q

Were you certified for visual speed

estimations?

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

Was it current on 14th of November

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

Did you visually estimate the speed of the

7

Ford compact car as it passed you?

8

A

I did.

9

Q

What was that estimation?

10

A

Eighty miles an hour.

11

Q

And then you ran the radar?

12

A

Yes, I released the radar beam.

I heard a

13

high audio Doppler.

14

my target window, it said 82 miles an hour.

15

'97?

Q

I locked in the speed, looked at

Did you feel at that point you had reasonable

16

suspicion to stop the vehicle for a speeding

17

violation?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

What did you do, then?

20

A

I immediately pursued the vehicle.

Came

21

right on the roadway.

There was no other vehicles

22

behind the vehicle.

23

pursued the vehicle and performed a traffic stop.

I pulled right out, immediately

24

Q

Did you follow the vehicle very long?

25

A

No, it took me a little bit to catch up to
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I believe mile marker 219 was the stopping point.

When I got behind the vehicle and activated my lights,
the vehicle immediately pulled to the right and
stopped.
Q

And what happened after you stopped the

vehicle?
A

I observed two male occupants in the vehicle.

No furtive movement.

I approached the driver's side

window and conducted my investigative stop.
Q

Now, can you tell me what the day was like,

the time of day and what kind of weather you were
having on that day?
A

It was in the morning after 9 o'clock.

It

was a beautiful day, the sun was shining, wasn't cold.
It was a pretty, sunny, bright day.
Q

Can you describe the windows in the vehicle?

Were they tinted at all or were they -A

I didn't notice whether the windows being

tinted or clear glass.
Q

Could you see in the vehicle as you came up?

A

I did.

Q

Could you see clearly?

A

Yes.

Q

What do you approximate your ability to see

clearly in the vehicle?
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A

The windows weren't obstructed*

dark tinted.

They weren't

I could clearly see the occupants of the

vehicle from behind the vehicle.

And as I approach

any vehicle, I take a moment to look inside of a
vehicle before I even approach the driver just to make
sure that I'm not walking into something that may be
detrimental to my safety.
Q

What happened as you approached the vehicle

in this case?
A

I approached the driver.

And I informed the

driver why I had stopped his vehicle.

But as I walked

up to the vehicle, I looked inside the vehicle.
area was clear.

Back

The molding -- as I looked through

the glass, the molding did not seem to be fitted
properly.
Q

The molding where?

A

In the back.

On the sides of the back seat,

there's plastic molding, and looking at the right rear
portion of the plastic, there was a gap.

It didn't

look like it was even with the -- it didn't look even.
It appeared to be gapped.

I noticed that.

I noticed

there was nothing in the back seat.
Q

Was this all before you made contact with the

driver?
A

Yes.

As I was walking up -- I don't walk
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just up on to a vehicle very quickly.

I just

gradually walked up and I was looking in the vehicle
and then I approached the driver.
Q

Now, what happened after you made contact

with the vehicle or with the driver?
A
vehicle.

I informed the driver why I had stopped his
I said#

"You're traveling -- I stopped your

vehicle for traveling 82 miles an hour in a 75 zone."
He pointed to his speedometer.

As I was looking at

the speedometer, the last speed mark was 80 miles an
hour and he said -- he pointed to the speedometer and
said his speedometer was right there at 80.

Didn't

think he was speeding.
Q

Did he make that comment that his speedometer

was right there at 80?
A

Yes.

He pointed to it.

Q

Have you had experience in stopping people

that sometimes you've stopped them for speeds in
excess of the limits of the -- or the capability of
the speedometer?
A

Yes.

There was several times where people

indicate to me that their speedometer isn't working or
there was no way that they could be going that fast
because the speedometer only goes to the limit on the
speedometer.

Happened several times.
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Q

Can you tell me what the geographic location

is around the area where you clocked the speed?

Is it

uphill, downhill, flat area?
A

Flat.

Where I was setting is almost the

crest of a hill.

Right after where I'm at, right

after the vehicles would have passed me, it starts to
decline.
Q

Is it a steep hill?

A

It's a gradual decline and then it's not --

it's not a 6 percent grade.

It's a gradual descent,

but I wouldn't think that it would be considered
steep•
Q

Is it sort of an incline that cars typically

lose speed going up it, or are they able to maintain
their normal speed as you can see them?
A

They can maintain the normal speed.

I would

like to say that when my car was brand-new I went
gradually down that hill because a lot of people say,
"Well, I'm going downhill, that's the reason why my
vehicle picked up speed.M
Vic.

I was in a brand-new Crown

When I let off the accelerator I slowed down

going down that hill.
Q

What happened after he indicated that he

thought his speedometer was at 80 miles an hour?
A

Well, there was some other things that I had
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noticed as I was talking to the driver.
Q

What?

A

Well, one of the first things that hit me

when he rolled the window down was the very strong
odor of an air freshener.
Q

What is it that makes that significant in

your eyes, Officer?
A

Well, in my experience heavily perfumed or

odors of fresheners are used sometimes to mask the
odors of other things that may be in the vehicle.
Q

Prior to November 14th of 1997, had you had

cases involving masked odors?
A

Yes, I've had several cases.

Q

Did this raise your suspicion that these

individuals might be engaged in other criminal
activity besides speeding?
A

I was beginning to form the opinion, that's

correct.
Q

Did you notice anything else about the

vehicle that raised your suspicions?
A

Well, there was a cellular phone.

maps in the console area.
not look at me.

There were

The right passenger would

He kept his head down and he would

not look at me when I was asking for identification.
Q

At this point in your stop, are you still
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conducting a speeding stop, or is it a detention -A

No, there was no -- I was still in my

investigative -- initial investigation of a speeding
violation.
Q

At this point how much time has elapsed?

How

long have you been at the window?
A

A minute to two minutes.

Q

Uh-huh (affirmative).

A

Not a long time.

Q

And, Officer, at some point did they give you

a registration of the vehicle?
A

Yes, they did.

Q

And what was the name on that registration?

A

Arroyo Manuel.

Mr. Bracero.

At that point I

identified him as Samuel Bracero from a California
driver's license.

I also asked the passenger for

identification and he had provided a citizenship
document.

I made a copy of it.

It appeared to be

authentic, and was identified as Arturo Ruiz.
And then I obtained the registration to the
vehicle and looked at the vehicle and I had stated to
Mr. Bracero that his name isn't on the registration.
I asked him if he was the registered owner, and he
said, "No."
Q

Did that raise any suspicions in your mind?
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A

Yes.

Q

Of what?

A

In my experience in dealing with individuals

with contraband, a lot of times the vehicle is not
registered in the driver's name nor is any of the
occupants the registered owner of the vehicle.
Q

Did that raise any suspicion in your mind

that the vehicle might be stolen?
A

It did.

I don't take it -- I don't take it

for granted when people tell me they are borrowing a
vehicle.

I usually run a check, and check the vehicle

and make sure it's not listed stolen.
Q

What happened after you examined the

registration and noted that the registered owner was
not in the vehicle?
A

Well, again I was forming the opinion that I

may have contraband in this vehicle.
Q

And I --

Specifically, what were those elements that

made you form that opinion?
A

Well, when I looked inside the vehicle and

there was nothing in the back seat, the plastic
appeared to have a gap in it -- uneven.

Those were

the things that I first saw as I looked in the
vehicle.

The rear seat appeared to be very dirty.

As

I approached the driver, then I got the strong smell
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of the air freshener.
maps.

I could see the cell phone, the

Talking with the owner, I asked him where he

was going.

He stated,

car from a friend.

M

To Idaho."

He borrowed the

All these things I was starting to

form an opinion that I had contraband in the vehicle.
Q

What did you do after?

A

I informed Mr. Bracero to remain in the

vehicle.

I then went back to my patrol vehicle and

ran a check on the vehicle and the occupants of the
vehicle.
Q

What did the check reveal?

A

Check revealed that Mr. Bracero's California

driver's license was suspended.
criminal history.

That he did have a

A triple "I" check was done on both

Mr. Bracero and Mr. Ruiz.

The vehicle was properly

registered and was not listed as stolen.
Criminal history on Mr. Bracero indicated to
me that there was weapons charges, larceny, alien
smuggling.

And Mr. Arturo had drug trafficking

charges, marijuana, hash, and there was also
"compartment," I believe, was also listed on his
criminal history.
Q

A secret compartment, you mean?

A

It just said "compartment." When -- dispatch

just indicated compartment.

I take that to mean that
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Mr. Ruiz was arrested for possession of marijuana and
the marijuana was found in a compartment.
Q

What did you do after that, Officer?

A

Well, while I was obtaining that information,

Mr. Bracero exited his vehicle and came walking right
toward me.

I had to stop, get out of my vehicle and

stop him halfway.

He appeared to me nervous and

worried about something.

I instructed Mr. Bracero to

return back to his vehicle and to sit in his vehicle.
Q

Did he do so?

A

He did so.

Q

What happened after that?

A

After I received all my information, I then

approached Mr. Bracero and asked him to exit the
vehicle and to come back to the back of the vehicle
with me, and he did that.
Q

And what did you say to Mr. Bracero?

A

The first thing I said, "Mr. Bracero, did you

know that your driver's license was suspended?"
acted very surprised.

He

And I said, "Well, have you

been arrested or traffic tickets, or some reason why
your license may be suspended?"

And he indicated to

me that he may have had a ticket -- I believe I got it
in my report -- indicated that he may have had an
unpaid ticket or something that may have caused that
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to be suspended.
Q

Did you feel you had reasonable grounds to

detain Mr. Bracero longer than a traffic ticket on the
suspended driver's license as well as your drug
suspicions?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

And what happened after he told you he may

have an unpaid ticket?
A

I continued to inform him -- I asked him how

long he had known Mr. Arturo, because now I have
knowledge that Mr. Arturo has a criminal history of
drug trafficking.

It wasn't very long -- I believe I

have got it in here -- six months that he stated that
he had known Mr. Arturo.

And I indicated to him that

Mr. Arturo has a criminal history of drug trafficking.
I asked him if he knew that.

He stated he did not.

I

asked him if there was contraband in the vehicle and
he said, "No," and invited me to search.
Q

Let me stop you there, Officer.

I want you

to look at your report on paragraph five and read that
silently to yourself and tell me if that refreshes
your recollection as to how many months Mr. Bracero
indicated he had known Arturo Ruiz.
A

Three months.

That's a correction.

I

believe that when I put three months in the report
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that's what he had told me.

I do remember that it was

a very short amount of time.
Q

I just wanted to clear that up.

A

Yes.

Q

Now; let me go back -- did you ask consent to

search the vehicle or did he volunteer to have you
search the vehicle?
A

When I asked him if there was contraband in

the vehicle, he said, "No," and invited me to search.
I then clarified that by asking him if I could search
his vehicle -- or search the vehicle.
Q
used?

Do you remember the specific terms that you
Did you use the word

A

Yes, I did.

"search"?

I asked him for his consent to

search the vehicle and he stated,

"Yes."

Q

Did he appear to understand you?

A

Oh, yes.

English.

Mr. Bracero spoke very good

Even though he looked Hispanic to me, he

spoke very good English.
Q

What did you do after that?

A

I approached the passenger side of the

vehicle first, because Arturo was there, and asked him
out of the vehicle.

And I believe I confronted

Mr. Arturo about his criminal history, and he would
not look at me straight.
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Q
mean?

When you say you confronted him, what do you
What did you say to him?

A

Well, I asked him out of the vehicle, that I

was going to search the vehicle.
to the front of the vehicle*

I asked him to step

He would not look at me

as I was asking him questions, but it was plain to me
that he was responding to what I was asking him to do.
And I believe I asked him if he had been arrested for
marijuana before.

And he said, "yes."

I asked him --

I told him -- informed him that his criminal history
showed an arrest for 30 pounds at a border, and he
indicated to me that was correct, that he was arrested
for that.
Q

Uh-huh (affirmative).

A

I spoke to him in English and he understood

that.

He spoke back to me in English.

Q

What happened after that?

A

After I asked him if he had any weapons on

him, he said, "No."

I felt comfortable that he was

not armed, that his presence wasn't going to
jeopardize my safety.

I placed him in the front of

the vehicle and asked him to stand there, and then I
was continuing the search.
real quick.

There was -- it happened

I found two receipts in the car door that

indicated one was out of Tijuana and one was another
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place.

And I went back to Mr, Bracero to ask him if

he had been in Mexico.

And it was right in there that

Mr. Bracero had opened up the trunk for me.
end of the trunk.

The back

He had opened that up for me.

And

it was a jacket, there was a small vinyl bag, there
was three unopened beer bottles -- let's see, a gym
bag, a black leather jacket, three unopened Miller
draft bottles, another flannel jacket, and on the side
compartment there were two small plastic cups.
appeared to be children's cups.

They

That was, I believe,

the first indication I had from Mr. Bracero that he
said -- stated those were his children's cups.
appeared to be dirty, dry.
there a long time.

They

They appeared to have been

I formed the opinion at that time

that Mr. Bracero had custody of this —
of this vehicle for some time.
that he had gotten food.

or possession

And he indicated to me

One of the receipts were for

food for his family and so forth.
Mr. Bracero was quite nervous -- beginning to
be nervous, and I felt at that time that I needed to
handcuff him.
Q

Why?

A

Well, again, everything that I was taking

into consideration led me to the opinion that I may
have contraband in this vehicle, and I felt like that
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if I got anywhere near that, that maybe my safety
might be jeopardized.

So I handcuffed Mr. Bracero.

He was a little bit reluctant for me to put on the
handcuffs.

I told him, I says, "This is only for your

safety as well as mine.
You're not arrested.

You're being detained.

You're just being detained while

I search your vehicle."

And he allowed me to put the

handcuffs on.
Q

Did you put handcuffs on Mr. Arturo Ruiz?

A

No, I did not.

Q

What happened after that?

A

After I searched through the back of the

vehicle -Q

The trunk area?

A

The trunk area.

Also, I'd like to say is

it's like a hatchback, and I could look right in the
back of the vehicle and I could see the rear seat.
And so then I went into the inside of the vehicle and
I lifted up on the rear seat, because again, the rear
seat to me looked like it was just sitting there.

It

didn't look like it was secure.
Q

Had you seen that upon your initial approach

to the vehicle?
A

Yes.

And the fact that it was dirty and

things didn't seem quite right in there, and the
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plastic panels.

When I looked at the seat -- and,

again, my memory came back when I first initially
looked at the vehicle, I could see why I saw that is
because when I put my hand on the seat, it moved.

In

fact, I just lifted the seat right up and brought the
seat out the right side of the doorway and sat it
upside the car.
Q

Then what happened?

A

Then I was concentrating on the plastic

panels.

And as I was looking at the plastic panels,

there was another -- when I -- I'd like to go back.
When I got the receipts in the glove box, there were
tools.

And there were screwdrivers -- there was

Phillips screwdrivers.

And as I looked closer at the

plastic panels inside the car, I could see that the
screws had been marred.
before.

They had been taken off

They were not -- it was not a car that had

not been left untouched.

It had been taken apart.

So

the screws looked marred to me, and I used the
screwdriver and started unscrewing the plastic panels
out of the vehicle.
As I was pulling the plastic panels off the
vehicle, my sergeant arrived, Sergeant Paul Mangleson
arrived.
Q

This is after you commenced the search?
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A

That's correct.

Paul arrived.

the door and he said, "What you got?"

He came up to
And I said, "I

think I may have some contraband in this vehicle, but
it's hidden.

It is not out front, but it's hidden."

He looked in the sides with me and there was
some insulation there on the sides.

After I had taken

the panel off, there was insulation and the framework
of the vehicle on the side.

And as I moved the

insulation, pulled the insulation away, I could see a
duct-taped package.

And then I went to the other

side -- that was the right side.

Then I went back to

the left side and did the same thing, and I observed
duct-tape packages in that side compartment.
Q

Did they appear to be contraband?

A

Yes.

And as I got close to them I could

smell -- at the time -- prior to the time I did not
have the odor of raw marijuana, but as I seen the
packages, I put my nose in the compartment, I could
smell the odor of raw marijuana.

I was under the

impression that I had raw marijuana in those packages.
Q

Officer, I'm showing you what's been marked

as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 -- excuse me, Plaintiff's
Exhibit No. 3 -- ask if you will identify that picture
for me?
A

That's the wrong one.

It's a photograph of
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Mr. Bracero, Mr. Ruiz, the vehicle that I had stopped.
It shows the packages of the marijuana on top.
Q

The reason I'm showing you this picture, is I

want you to comment, Officer, whether the daylight and
the clarity of the day as depicted in the picture
truly and accurately reflect the day that you stopped
them?
A

Yes.

are clear.

Clear, bright, sunny day.

It's a very clear day.

The windows

Everything seems

clear and sharp to me.
Q

Did you take pictures on the day of the stop?

A

I did.

Sergeant Paul Mangleson took -- I

took two pictures myself with a Polaroid, and Sergeant
Mangleson took these pictures.
Q

Showing you Exhibit 4, ask if you could

briefly identify that?
A

This is a picture of me folding back the

insulation and exposing the duct-tape packages inside
of the fender frame.
Q

Number 5, can you please identify that?

A

It's a picture of the right side of the

vehicle.

A two-door, compact, Ford vehicle, clear

windows, packages of marijuana on top.
Q

Okay.

Do these all truly and accurately

reflect the way it appeared on the date of the events?

NORA S. WORTHEN, RPR, CSR
(828) 652-0318

26

A

Yes, they do.
MR. LEAVITT:

Your Honor, just for purposes

of this hearing, I would move to introduce 3, 4 and 5.
MR. RENEER:
THE COURT:

No objection, your Honor.
I'm going to receive 3, 4 and 5

for purposes of this hearing.
(State's Exhibit Nos. 3, 4 & 5
were received into evidence.)
MR. LEAVITT:
defense memorandum.

Your Honor, I have read the
I have not responded as yet but

would intend to do so after this hearing.

I note that

their arguments go toward the validity of the stop and
also the validity of the detainment.
Their motion states that their motion is for
the reason set forth in the memorandum.

For that

reason I don't believe there are any other issues that
they are raising, and for that reason I will stop.
Thank you.
THE COURT:

You may cross.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. RENEER:
Q

You testified that you came up on the

driver's side of the vehicle -- of the defendants'
vehicle -- and looked at them as they rolled down the
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window, that's when you saw the maps, and air
freshener, and cell phone?
A

Yes.

Q

You also at that time saw the loose panel?

A

I saw the loose panels before.

Q

Okay.

I'm unclear as to exactly where you

saw the loose panel and what loose panel you saw.
A

Well, I shouldn't say it was loose.

was gaps in it.

There

As I approached the vehicle, I looked

through the rear vehicle.

I slowly looked through --

there's a big side window behind the driver's window,
and I looked into that, I looked straight across at
the plastic panel.
Q

At the passenger's side?

A

Oh, no.

Oh, I thought you were talking at

the beginning of the stop.
Q

Right, but I'm saying the passenger's side of

the plastic?
A

Yes, that's correct.

Q

And where on that plastic was there a gap?

Below the window, above the window, the rear window?
A

Below the window, there's a plastic that

comes up this way.

There the plastic meets.

There's

a gap there.
Q

I'm still -- I want to make sure we have
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this.

Exactly where -- the plastic meets where?

The

plastic is the back panel on the passenger side that's
covering the panel?
A

That's correct.

Q

Okay.

You saw the side up against the door

was loose?
A

It's not loose.

There was a gap.

Q

Or a gap?

A

What I saw was gaps between where plastic

pieces come together inside of the vehicle.
Q

Which two pieces of plastic, from the front

door to the rear panel?
A
way.

There's a plastic that comes down around this
There's a plastic that comes across and --

Q

When you say "this way down," do you mean it

comes this way in front of the passenger or behind the
passenger?
A

Behind.

It's behind.

back of the vehicle.
the vehicle.

I'm looking at the

I'm not looking at the front of

I'm looking at the back of the vehicle.

The back seat.
Q

Okay.

A

I remember a plastic coming down from the

side directly behind the window and a plastic coming
across•
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Q

Wasn't that, in fact, all one piece?

A

No.

I took several pieces out of there.

They came in -- no, it was not one bit -- there was
several pieces in there.
explain to you.

That's what I'm trying to

There was a gap between the plastic

that I could see.
MR. RENEER:

We had planned to wait until the

end of the cross to show a video, but I think we can
show from the video that we have taken of the car in
impound that it's all one piece that covers that back
panel•
Do you have any objection to us showing that
right now?
MR. LEAVITT:

Well, I think that the

appropriate time would be to do it on your case.

If

you want to ask the officer questions -MR. RENEER:

Well, I would like to -- I'm

interested to know exactly where he saw this gap, and
it might be easier to show that with the video.
THE COURT:

I think you can show it if you

want to as part of cross-examination.
MR. HUNT:

Your Honor, may I push this up

closer to the bench and find an outlet?
THE COURT:
MR. RENEER:

That would be good.
All being used right in front
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here.
(VCR was set up.)
MR. LEAVITT:

Your Honor, for the record,

State, prior to the hearing this morning, has
stipulated that this is a videotape that Mr. Reneer
shot.

We'll stipulate to its admission or to its

viewing at this point.
THE COURT:

I'm going to allow it for the

purpose of this hearing.
THE INTERPRETER:
THE COURT:

Today's hearing.

MR. RENEER:
spot.

Purposes of?

We had placed this at a certain

I don't know, we may want to rewind this.

It's

only about a minute and a half total.
(Viewing the videotape.)
THE INTERPRETER:

Is there an audio portion

to this video, or is it something that the accused or
the interpreter needs to see to be able to have proper
interpretation?
THE COURT:

No, we are just looking at the

video portion.
(Viewing the videotape.)
MR. RENEER:

We don't have a good pause on

this, so we may have to see if we can't just catch it
as we're going.
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Q

There's looking in through the window at an

angle, about where, if you were leaning down looking
through, with Samuel setting there as the officer is.
Now, where is it from that angle did you see the gap,
if we can just -- we've all seen it.
A

Well, you went very fast with your --

Q

Sure.

A

But it was through the rear window, looking

Sure.

But if you can --

at the right side, there's a plastic molding coming
down.
MR. HUNT:

Does that have a frame by frame?

MR. RENEER:

It doesn't.

There is a slow

motion.
MR. HUNT:

Put it in slow motion.

MR. RENEER:

It's not clear because it is

a -THE WITNESS:

I'm looking in the back.

Now,

you're past -- I'm more straight into the window
looking and you need to turn your camera to where I
can see it -- the angle that I'm looking at.

I

haven't seen the angle that I'm looking at through
your video.
Q

(By Mr. Reneer)

I'll go all the way to the

beginning here and see if we can get a slower look.
Now, I'm not going to be able to show what you saw
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through the back window because there was snow on the
vehicle and I should have removed that*

But I mostly

want to get that there's one piece of plastic that
covers that whole panel.
A

Well

—

Q

Other than the strip that's on the

floorboard.
A

I took several strips out.

Q

One piece that goes along the back window --

top of the back window?
A

That was -- that was, I believe the gap is

where that came down and ended.
MR. HUNT:

I'm going to give you the control.

THE WITNESS:
MR. HUNT:

No, I don't want the control.

So you can pause it when you

want -- could do that?
THE WITNESS:

I saw -- I still haven't seen

the angle that I saw.
MR. HUNT:

Right.

THE WITNESS:
MR. HUNT:

Looking in your video.

Here's the pause button, and if

you do see that angle, why don't you just hit pause.
That would be the easiest way to do it.
THE WITNESS:
that, sir.

I would rather have you do

You just go ahead and ask me questions.
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Q

(By Mr. Reneer)

Do you see any angle there

as we go by that would show anything as to how you
show this?
A

Well, there was a.
MR. HUNT:

Stop it.

THE WITNESS:

No, right there.

(Admonishment by the court reporter
and the interpreter.)
THE WITNESS:
Q

Sorry.

(By Mr. Reneer)

snow right there.

Okay.

Go back.

Stop it with that

Now, just for purposes, at

least explaining -- let's assume we can see the
window -- just for positions, not that we can actually
see it here.
A

Sure.

Q

You come in and you saw the gap along here?

A

No.

Q

Where that met in the side panel?

A

No.

Q

Okay.

A

No.

From where I saw the gap was looking

pretty much straight through the side window.
Q

Through the side window, like this?

A

Yeah.

Q

Let's say this the opposite side window, when
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you're looking, which part did you see the gap?
here?

Down

Up here?

A

May I stand up?
MR. HUNT:

I think I can advance it.

THE WITNESS:

As I approached the vehicle,

I'm looking in a vehicle from the back, I look at the
vehicle.
THE INTERPRETER:

Your Honor, may the

interpreter have a clear view of the witness while he
is on the stand?
THE WITNESS:

Sorry.

THE INTERPRETER:

That will facilitate

interpretation clearly.
THE WITNESS:

I approach the vehicle, and I'm

approaching the driver's side.
rear of the vehicle.

I'm looking in the

As I come to the window, I

believe I even got my hand on the vehicle, and I'm
looking in and I'm looking straight across and I can
see the molding and I can see a gap, is what I'm
talking about right there.
Q

(By Mr. Reneer)

Well, okay.

molding you can see the gap.
over the whole car.

You see the

Well, The molding goes

So what I'm trying to do is focus

in on where on the molding you see the gap -A

Well

—
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Q

-- below the window?

A

Behind the window and --

Q

Like back here?

A

As the plastic comes down, the plastic comes

down there appears to be gaps on the plastic from
where it meets the other part of the interior of the
car.
Q

Right where my finger is?

A

Well, I think it might -- might be right next

to the seat or in front of the seat.
Q

You're not sure?

A

I'm not sure.

I saw the gap.
there.
Q

I don't remember exactly where

I just saw the gaps in the plastic

It was in the back.

One of them was this way.

You know, it goes across the bottom of the

window.
MR. LEAVITT;

I think he has testified he

doesn't recall where it was.
THE INTERPRETER:

Could the volume be raised

on the attorney's voice as to that last comment.

When

it's so soft and such a long distance away, I'm not
able to hear that.
MR. LEAVITT:

I objected to the question,

your Honor, on the basis that I think the officer
testified that he doesn't recall the exact location of
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the molding,
THE COURT:
objection.

I'm going to overrule the

If you can answer it, you can answer it.

THE WITNESS:

Okay, sir.

As I looked across

I could see a gap in the molding between the molding
on the side of the car, and I'm looking right at it,
but it may be just above the window, may be just below
the window.

I'm not quite sure.

MR. RENEER:

I would have to --

Your Honor, if I might say for

the record, that the video shows, if we were to look
through it right now, which we can do that, that that
is

one

piece of molding that comes up to the window

and sits along there and goes beneath the seat.
There's no way you can see a gap up there.
MR. LEAVITT:

The videotape doesn't show

that, your Honor.
MR. RENEER:

It can if we go through it.

THE COURT:

I think when we -- right now we

are cross-examining the witness.

Afterwards you can

put on the evidence you wish to put on, Mr. Reneer.
MR. RENEER:

Okay.

MR. LEAVITT:
of the record now.
THE COURT:

I would say the video is part

Didn't you accept it, admit it?
All I did was allow him to show

it at that point.
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MR* LEAVITT:
MR. RENEER:

Okay.
We'll come back to that, then.

I did just want to get -- I wanted to be clear where
you were saying the gap was.

I don't know if we've

gotten any closer to that or not.
Q

To reiterate where you were, you had come to

the driver's door, you had looked through the back
window.

He had rolled down the window, smelled air

freshener.

At this time you testified on direct that

you saw the air freshener, saw the cell phone and the
maps in the console on the side of the driver?
A

That's correct.

Q

What -- when you found out that Mr. Bracero's

license was suspended, hypothetically without probable
cause or any indication that drugs might be involved,
what would be your normal procedure for somebody with
a suspended license?

Do you take them into custody or

do you write them a ticket and release them?
A

I've done both ways.

If I was of the opinion

that the individual would not appear in court on a
driver's suspension arrest, I have taken them into the
jail.
Q

How many times have you done that, would you

estimate?
A

I would say that more times I have released
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people on a suspended license than I have taken them
to jail.
Q

I can't give you a number.
Normal procedure, generally, would be to

write them a ticket and let them proceed?
A

Well, no.

If they don't have a valid

driver's license and there's nobody else in the
vehicle that can drive the vehicle, then the vehicle
will be parked or be caused to be removed by a tow
truck.
Q

Did you ask the passenger if he had a

driver's license?
A

I asked him if he had any identification, and

he provided -- it wasn't until after the arrest that I
believe I found in his wallet an expired -- give me a
minute to look.

What he furnished me -- I asked for

identification.

What he furnished me was what

appeared to be an authentic U.S. citizenship paper.
Q

At that time you did not receive a driver's

license from him?
A

That's correct.

Q

After you found out that the driver,

Mr. Bracero had a suspended license, you did not ask
Arturo to see if he had a valid driver's license?
A

I don't believe I did, no.

Q

You testified that you approached Mr. Bracero
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about Mr. Ruiz's prior drug conviction?
A

Yes.

Q

You told him that he had a drug conviction

for smuggling and that it made you believe there may
be contraband in the vehicle; is that correct?
A

Yes.

Q

Now, you also at that time say that

Mr. Bracero gave you consent to search the vehicle
directly after that?
A

He invited me to search the vehicle.

I

asked -- I informed him that Mr. Arturo had a criminal
history for smuggling, for drug trafficking, and I
believe I asked him how long he had known him.

And I

asked him if there was any contraband in the vehicle.
Q

My point is, you started the search at that

time?
A

He invited me -- well, he invited me.

said, "Go ahead and search the vehicle."

He

And I asked

him, "Can I search your vehicle for contraband?" and
he stated,
Q

"Yes."

And the first thing you searched was the

trunk?
A

No.

Q

That's what you have testified to.

A

Well, it's a point in there where I was
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concerned about getting Mr. Arturo out of the vehicle.
And it might be right at that point that he had
Q

—

When you started the search, the first thing

you did was search the trunk?
A

No.

No.

I approach Arturo.

consent and he stated,

M

Yes. M

I asked him for

I approach Arturo,

asked him to exit the vehicle.
Q

Okay.

Regardless of that, when you started

the search -A

No, because when he got out of the vehicle I

saw some receipts.

There was receipts in the side

compartment.
Q

Okay, then.

So after the receipts, then, you

started the search of the trunk?
A

But I took Mr. Arturo to the front of the

vehicle and I got back to Mr. Bracero at the trunk.
And then I went back there.

There was a point where I

found those receipts.
Q

How did you open the trunk?

A

Mr. Arturo opened the trunk for me.

Q

Okay.

A

There was a problem with that trunk.

I think

the door couldn't stay open by itself.
MR. HUNT:

Just one minute, please, Officer.

THE WITNESS:

I don't think the truck door
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would stay open.
Q

(By Mr. Reneer)

You have your police report

in front of you?
A

Yes, right.

Q

See if you're refreshed by paragraph 6 where

it states that you went through the entire contents of
the trunk and then went to the passenger door and
opened it and found the two receipts; is that correct?
A

That's correct.

That's the way my police

report -- then I went to the passenger door -Q

Let's back up there a little bit.

A

-- after --

Q

It says here that Samuel opened the trunk for

you.

Is that how you remember it?
A

Yes.

stay open.

If I remember right, the truck wouldn't

You had to hold it open because it come

back down because I remember putting a tire to hold
the door from coming down.
Q

Prior to opening the trunk --

A

Okay, prior to opening the trunk.

Q

-- when you went to open it, did you put the

key in the lock?
A

Samuel -- he did that.

But I think there was

a problem with the lock on the rear of the -- the key,
I think there was a problem there with the trunk lock.
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He opened the trunk.
the key.

I don't know exactly if he used

He opened it up —

opened the trunk.

Q

Mr. Bracero?

A

Bracero.

Q

Upon searching the contents of the trunk, you

didn't find anything incriminating?
A

Well, there was the alcohol there, but I

didn't smell any alcohol in my investigation up to
that point.
Q

They were closed containers, correct?

A

That's correct.

Q

Then you searched the interior of the car

and -A

Well, I handcuffed Mr -- Mr. Bracero was

becoming very nervous -Q

Well

—

A

-- so I handcuffed him.

Q

Be that as it may, if you would stick to the

questions that I'm asking.
A

Okay.

I thought we were kind of going in

chronological order here.
Q

We did most of that on direct.

A

Okay.

Q

I'll just pick out the points --

A

I'm sorry, sir.

All right.

Go ahead.
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Q

So then you searched the interior of the car,

and isn't it true that you didn't find anything until
Officer Mangleson got there and searched with you?
A

That's correct.

As far as contraband goes,

that's correct.
Q

But you testified previously that you had

already taken the panels off?
A

That's correct.

I was taking the panels off

when Paul arrived.
Q

If you could look at paragraph 7.

exactly did Sergeant Mangleson arrive?

Now, when

You say here

that -A

Approximately 9:50 hours.

Q

It says that you performed -- you pulled a

piece of insulation out, after he arrived, from the
right-side panel.
A

That's correct.

Q

How did you pull that off without taking the

panel off?
A

The panel was off.

Q

Well, it says that you took the panels off

after that, in your police report.

Wasn't there a

little window on the panel, like for an ashtray?
A

Yes, there was.

Q

What I'm getting at is that in all the time
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you were searching the inside of the car you were
unable to find anything even after inspecting those
panels, taking them off, looking at the insulation,
popping them back on, it wasn't until after Sergeant
Mangleson came you actually unscrewed them again
searching the interior of the car?
A

No*

No, I was inside the car taking the

plastic panels off.

I had them taken off.

off the back that come across.
the side off.

Paul arrived.

I had one

I had it off.

I had

Insulation was there.

We pulled the insulation back and saw the package,
(reading inaudibly from report)

I guess Paul was

there when -- looking at my report, sir -- Paul was
there when I was unscrew- -- when we unscrewed those
panels.
Q

So your previous testimony was incorrect in

the time frame?
A

Well, it was all right there at the seconds

that this -- that we had found that.

I was inside,

the seat was out, I was observing the panels, the
marred screws, the gaps.
exposed.

There was insulation

And the insulation was exposed probably

because, like I mentioned, there was probably a door
right there, like an ashtray door that I had pulled
out.
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Q

Hadn't you actually pulled that off and

popped it back on prior to Sergeant Mangleson coming?
Isn't that correct?
A

I don't quite remember that, but I was inside

the car when he approached.

I was inside the car

taking those items apart.
MR. RENEER:
THE COURT:
MR. LEAVITT:

Nothing further at this time.
Thank you.

Any redirect?

Just a little point of

housekeeping, your Honor.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. LEAVITT:
Q

Trooper, look at paragraph 6 of your report.

Read the first three sentences of it to yourself and
tell me if it refreshes your recollection as to how
Mr. Bracero opened the trunk.
A

Yes, I remember taking Mr. Arturo to the

front of the vehicle.
rear of the vehicle.

I remember coming back to the
I remember Samuel opening the

trunk lock, and opening the trunk.
MR. LEAVITT:

Thank you.

Nothing further.

RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. HUNT:
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Q

When you say you remember Samuel opening the

trunk lock, did he do that with his keys from the car?
You made a motion like the key turning.
MR. LEAVITT:

Your Honor, I'm not sure you

can tag team.
THE COURT:

Sustained.

THE INTERPRETER:

Your Honor, could we have a

definition of tag team?
MR. LEAVITT:

Specifically, your Honor, the

rules prohibit two attorneys cross-examining one
witness.

Sorry.
THE INTERPRETER:

That's all right.

I guess

I have never played tag in Spanish before.
MR. RENEER:
THE COURT:

Permission?
Yes.

RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. RENEER:
Q

Mr. Bracero used the key to open the trunk?

A

I believe he did.

And the reason why I say

that is because I remember looking at the lock on the
trunk itself and it looked strange to me.

For some

reason in the back of my mind it looked strange like
it had been jimmied before.
key.

I believe he used the

I believe.
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MR. RENEER:

That's all.

MR. LEAVITT:
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Nothing further.
You can step down, Officer.

Any other witnesses?
MR. LEAVITT:
THE COURT:

No.

State rests.

Is there evidence the defendants

wish to put on?
MR. RENEER:

Yes, your Honor.

We want to

call Sam Bracero.
THE COURT:

Mr. Bracero.

SAMUEL BRACERO,
called as a witness by the Defense, was duly sworn
and testified as follows:
THE CLERK:

You do solemnly swear that the

testimony you shall give in the case now pending
before the court will be the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

I do.

Please be seated, sir.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. RENEER:
Q

State your name for the record.

A

Samuel Enrique Bracero.
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Q

And on November 14 you were pulled over by a

Utah Highway Patrolman in the morning?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

What was the condition of the road that

morning?
A

Condition as far as -- it was clear, it was

sunny.
Q

Were you on a hill?

A

Yes, I was -- when -- at the moment when I

seen the trooper at the top, he was at the top of like
a slight -Q

You were approaching him at an incline?

A

Yes.

Q

When you saw him, what happened?

A

When I saw him, it's been human -- not my

normal reaction ever since I have been driving, once I
see a cop on the freeway, I usually check my
speedometer, make sure I'm not going over the speed
limit.
Q

What did your speedometer read?

A

At that time it was approximately between 75

and 77.

The speedometer needle was fluctuating up and

down more or less.
MR. LEAVITT:

I didn't hear that response.

What was that again?
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THE WITNESS:

Between 75 and 77, the needle

was fluctuating up between the 75 and the other little
notch*
Q

(By Mr. Reneer)

When you were pulled over

by the officer, did he tell you why he had stopped
you?
A

Yes, sir, he did.

Q

What did he tell you?

A

He said that he had caught me speeding.

Q

Did you protest?

A

Yes, I did.

Because at that time he had

mentioned that he had clocked me at 82 miles an hour.
And I had explained to him that, first off that's
impossible, because on my speedometer when I seen him
it was -- I was doing between 75 and 77.

And on top

of that I just mentioned to him that my speedometer
tops out at 80.
Q

And the speedometer was not at the 80 mark?

A

No, sir.

Q

That would have been easy to determine?

A

Yes, sir, it was at the 75 to 77.

It was --

When I

seen him, I actually slowed down a little bit more.
Q

What was the next thing he said to you?

A

He asked me if I was Mexican.

Q

What did you tell him?
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A

I told him, "No, I'm a U.S. citizen."

Q

And did he address the passenger as well?

A

At first he asked me for my driver's license,

which I then gave him my driver's license.

And then

he addressed the passenger with the same question, if
he was Mexican.
Q

How did he say it?

A

He said, "Are you Mexican?" Those were his

exact words.
Q

Now, after Officer Metz returned to his car

and you had given him the information, Officer has
testified that you left the car.
A

Why did you do that?

Well, I was sitting back like -- okay.

I was

sitting back, like I guess -- I was waiting for him.
I thought he was going to write me a ticket.

Sitting

back, and in the rearview mirror he was opening up and
I seen him gesturing with his hand.

So then I opened

up his door, and I went to the back and we met more or
less by where the trunk of my vehicle was.

At that

spot is more or less where we met.
Q

He motioned you to go back to your car but

instead got out and met you?
A

No, he didn't, no- -- no, he motioned.

I was

looking in the rearview mirror watching him, and he
goes like -- I seen him go like this, when he opened
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up the car, I came out and we met more or less by
where the trunk is at the end of the car, by like the
rear bumper.
Q

What did he say to you at that time?

A

At that time he then proceeded to ask me

if -- he told me that my license was suspended.
not aware my license was suspended.

I was

He had then

mentioned to me that -- I asked him why was my license
suspended.
that."

He said, "The computer does not show

And then he proceeded to let me know -- asked

me how long I've known the passenger, Mr. Ruiz.
told him approximately three months.

I

He then asked me

if I was aware that he had a prior for smuggling drugs
across the U.S. border.

I told him no, I was not

aware, which I was not aware of.
Q

What was the next thing the officer told you?

A

Next thing he did was to place my hands

behind my back.
arrested?

I asked him, "Why?

Why am I being

He then said that I was not being arrested,

that I was just being detained so I do not run.
then told him, "Why should I run?
run."

And I

I have no reason to

He just said, "Just please put your hands

behind your back," and I proceeded and he then
handcuffed me.
Q

Mr. Ruiz the co-defendant was still in the
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passenger seat at this time?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

Then what happened?

A

Then he told me that he was going to search

the car.

He didn't ask me.

He told me.

I didn't

respond.

I didn't give him no response whatsoever.

He then proceeded to the driver's side, took the key
out of the ignition, went to the back and attempted to
open the trunk with the key.

He tried numerous keys,

because I do have four -- there were four sets of car
keys on the same key ring.
Q

So he was unable to open the trunk?

A

Yes.

doesn't open.

That trunk -- the cylinder, itself, it
It's a damaged cylinder.

you put the key in it is a dead turn.
and spins.

The key -- if
It just spins

It doesn't catch the groove.

Q

So at that point what did the officer do?

A

At this point the officer took the key back

out and went toward the driver's side door, opened the
driver's side door.
trunk pop.

Next thing I know I hear the

There's an electric switch, and he then

had popped the switch.
Q

Where is that electric switch?

A

Inside the glove compartment.

Q

That's the only way the trunk can open?
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A

Yes, sir.

Q

Does the trunk stay open by itself?

A

Once it's open, no, you have to put something

there to hold the trunk up.

As a matter of fact it

almost came down on his hands when he attempted to let
it go.

And he had grabbed the tire from the spare

tire -- you know, the slot where the spare tire is,
and it put the spare tire standing up this way,
holding up between the bottom of the trunk and the
door of the trunk, holding up the trunk door.
Q

What did he do once he had the trunk open?

A

He then proceeded, he asked me when was my

last drink of alcohol.

I had told him the night

before in the hotel room.

And he looks inside and he

goes, "As a matter of fact" -- then is when I told
him, "As a matter of fact, there are the leftover
beers from last night.

I only had two or three

beers. "
Q

And you were standing behind the officer?

A

I was standing next to him.

We were both

behind the trunk -- behind the car by the trunk.

I

was more or less on the passenger side by where the
gas tank nozzle is, and he was standing more or less
at center of the trunk.
Q

With your hands cuffed behind your back?
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A

I was handcuffed, yes, sir.

Q

Behind your back?

A

Behind my back, yes*
MR. LEAVITT:

Your Honor, I'm going to ask

that he not lead the witness.
THE COURT:
Q

Sustained.

(By Mr. Reneer)

What did he search, then,

next?
A

He then proceeded, and asked me, "What's all

this in the trunk?"

And I pointed out that it was a

jacket, a flannel shirt, which was my property, also
my bag.
Q

How did you point?

A

I pointed out to him.

I told him -- I told

him specifically, I said, "That's mine."
Q

With what part of your body did you point?

A

Like this.

I said, "That one right there is

mine, that jacket is mine."
this black bag?"
Arturo's."
Q

He goes, "And whose is

I said, "That one?

That's

I had to head gesture.

Let the record reflect that the defendant

pointed with his chin and his lip pointed.
A

I was going like this, "That's mine.

Yes."

That is the way I was (indicating).
Q

He went through your bag, then?
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A

He asked me if this is mine.

I said, "Yes."

And he then opened it up and then he took out my
leather jacket.

He took out a flannel shirt.

out the beers and placed it on the floor.
was on the floor he went through it.

While it

Then he pulled

out the black bag and said, "Is this yours?"
again, I said, "No, that Mr. Ruiz'."
him "Mr. Ruiz."
Q

He took

Once

I didn't call

I called him "Arturo."

Could you clarify "the floor"?

Do you mean

the ground?
A

Yes.

The ground.

I'm sorry, the ground.

Q

After he was finished searching your bag,

what did the officer do?
h

He asked me, "Whose bag is this?"

"It's Arturo's."

I said,

He then proceeded around to Arturo

and opened up the passenger side door, told Arturo to
stand up, and then he opened up the bags in front of
Arturo.

Placed them on the floor.

Q

On the ground?

A

On the ground next to the passenger side

door, on the ground.

He placed bag, opened it up and

went through it.
Q

Was that visible to you?

A

Yes, sir, it was.

Q

Could you hear what they were saying?
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A

Just, basically, he asked him -- at that time

I had heard —
the search.

it wasn't no conversation pertaining to

It was basically, he asked him if he had

any priors, and he had -- Mr. Arturo had mentioned to
him, yes, he did.

And officer Metz had then come up

and asked him, "For what?"

And he told him, "For

drugs, a very long time ago."

And then he asked him,

"How many pounds are we bringing this time?"
remark.

Was his

Then he had stood up and placed Arturo in

front of the vehicle by the engine on the front by,
you know, I guess the quarter panel fender you would
call it.
Q

Did the officer make you aware that any

contraband had been found up to that point?
A

No, sir.

Q

What did the officer do after that?

A

After that he had came back and he asked me

again if we were bringing any drugs or weapons in the
vehicle.

I told him, "Not that I know of."

He told

me if Arturo had any drugs or weapon with him.
said, "I have no idea.

I

You would have to ask him."

He then proceeded back to the front of the
car and looked on the passenger's side, there's like a
little slot, I guess, like where you could store
stuff.

And he pulled out some papers and he had said
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to me, "Are these receipts from a Mexican store?"
I explained to him, I said, "I have no idea.

And

I can't

see them from over here."
He had brought them over and he had showed
them to me, and I said, "No, it clearly states right
there.

Look. M

And I went like that again.

I said,

"One is from San Diego," and then he showed me the
other one, and I said."
Tijuana".

Yes, that one is from

I told him, I said, "It clearly states it

on the receipt."
Q

Was your signature on those receipts or were

they just register receipts?
A

If I remember correctly, they were

supermarket receipts, cash register receipts.
Q

And was there anything -- were they a receipt

that you would sign -A

No.

Q

-- or in any way --

A

No.

Normal cash register receipts.

THE INTERPRETER:

Your Honor, sometime in the

next ten minutes might we take a brief recess.

We

have been going more than an hour.
THE COURT:

Yes.

THE INTERPRETER:
MR. RENEER:

Thank you.

We will be done with this
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1

witness in just a second.
Q

2

(By Mr. Reneer)

Would it be all right if we

3

just go through the video for a couple of minutes, and

4

then we will be done with this witness, or would you

5

rather do that after a break?

6

THE COURT:

7

THE INTERPRETER:

Just go ahead.
Might there be an extension

8

cord?

9

if the interpreter can see the video.
I could use my extension cord to stand over

10
11

here if that's acceptable.
THE COURT:

12
13

It facilitates greatly with the interpretation

Why don't you step over as far as

you can get, Mr. Anderson.

14

THE INTERPRETER:

15

MR. RENEER:

16

THE WITNESS:

17

MR. RENEER:

Thank you very kindly.

Can you see that?
I can see that.

That's fine.

Let's see where we are at.

(Viewing the videotape.)

18
Q

19

(By Mr. Reneer)

Okay.

Now, Mr. Bracero, is

20

that a fair representation of your car that you were

21

in?

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

And is the man sitting in the driver seat

24

sitting essentially how you were sitting when the

25

officer approached you?
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A

Yes.

Q

I don't know if I should rewind it and let it

play through a couple of times since we don't have a
good pause.

But I will rewind it a little bit, and I

would like the defendant to tell me what he can see in
the console from this position.
A

I just basically --

Q

Let me rewind it a little bit, okay?

A

I just see him.

Q

So he is looking in right there?

A

Looking in right there.

All I see is the

arm, the steering wheel, and just the upper body to,
like, the upper thighs.
Q

Can you see if there was anything in the

console?
A

Couldn't see.

Q

Could it be seen from where Officer Metz was

standing?
A

No.

Q

I'd like to also -- whoops, wrong button.

that the trunk?

Is

Is that your license plate there?

A

Yes, that is the license plate of the car.

Q

Should I make the record aware that they are

showing that the cylinder will not open the trunk?
THE COURT:

Whatever you want to show.
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angle, or his head looking in through the window, I
mean, what other angle could there be of that?
video actually shows several angles.

That

We would have to

run through it a bunch of times since we don't have
the benefit of a four-head VCR that could show the
pause.

I would like to admit the whole thing for the

judge's review, and he can make his own decision on
whether the angles are appropriately covered, at his
leisure.
THE COURT:

Anything else, Mr. Leavitt?

MR. LEAVITT:

No, your Honor, except to state

that, you know, this depicts somebody sitting in the
front seat, sitting quite still.

I think if you could

get a truly accurate videotape simulation of what's
going on, you would have people moving around in the
vehicle, looking for registration, I just don't think
it's an accurate depiction of what occurred that day.
THE COURT:

I'm going to receive the

exhibit -- the videotape, as an exhibit.
(Defendants' Exhibit No. 7 was
received into evidence.)
MR. RENEER:

I'm going to remove the

videotape and have it marked as Exhibit 3 -- Defense
Exhibit 3.
THE COURT:

Well, whatever is the next
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number.
THE CLERK:

7.

THE COURT:

7.

MR. RENEER:

7?

THE COURT:

We don't start over with defense

numbers.
MR. RENEER:

I see.

And then you have

already accepted this into evidence?
THE COURT:

Yes, I have received Exhibit

No. 7 .
MR. RENEER:

I don't think we need to review

this at this time anymore.
MR. HUNT:

May I approach, your Honor?

THE COURT:
MR. RENEER:

Yes, sir.
Your Honor, may I approach the

witness, your Honor?
THE COURT:
MR. RENEER:

You may.
Your Honor, plaintiff has

stipulated to the foundation evidence for these two
pictures.

I'd like to show them to the defendant.
THE COURT:
MR. RENEER:

They are exhibit numbers?
Defendant Exhibit 1, Defendant

Exhibit 2.
MR. LEAVITT:

Your Honor, for the record, I

have stipulated that these photographs were taken by
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Mr. Reneer on the 11th of December of 1997 for
foundational -- for those foundational requirements.
I have not stipulated to their admissibility.
Q

(By Mr. Reneer)

I would like you to review

those photographs and tell me if you believe they are
a fair and accurate representation of what it looks
like # what your car looks like with somebody sitting
in it?
A

Yes.

Q

I'd like to offer these exhibits for

admission as showing the interior of the car as at
least from one angle that Officer Metz may have looked
into the vehicle when he approached it from the driver
window.
MR. LEAVITT:

Your Honor, we'd object.

think the lighting is different.
is different.

We

We think the angle

We don't think it truly and accurately

reflects what Hoby Metz saw.

We don't think this

witness is competent to testify at the angle he saw
things.
MR. RENEER:

We are not offering it as the

exclusive angle he may have seen things, but as an
angle of what it may have looked like.
THE COURT:
exhibits.

I'm going to receive the two

I think your objection goes really more to
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the weight to be given.
MR. LEAVITT:
Q

It does, your Honor.

(By Mr. Reneer)

Was the odor of air

freshener strong in your car?
A

No, it was not.

Q

How old was the air freshener?

A

I wouldn't know.

Q

Where was the air freshener sitting?

A

It was placed between the driver and the

A few weeks, a month.

passenger in the middle there.

It's a stick shift

car, and right behind the gears, the stick, is the
hand brake.

Being that the bottom of the can did not

have any tape, I had placed it underneath there so it
could be held a little pinch by the hand brake down so
it wouldn't swing all over the car.

It was placed on

the bottom right there.
Q

Where were the maps?

A

The maps were between that same place and the

passenger seat, in between, like this down -- it's
like a little gap in between there.

It was placed

right there.
Q

And the cell phone?

A

The cell phone I had plugged into the car

adapter into the ashtray.

The adapter was coming out.

The cell phone was placed on that moment on the seat
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Q

(By Mr* Reneer)

Mr. Bracero, did you

observe the officers taking apart the panels in the
back of the car?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

How many pieces did they remove from the car?

A

Two pieces.

Q

Could you explain what those pieces were?

A

Yes.

They were the two side -- one from the

driver's side; one from the passenger side.

The

paneling was placed on the back seat area of the
window.
Q

That is all one piece?

One side is one

piece -A

Each side has just one whole piece.

Two pieces.

There's

One for the left, one for the right.

Q

And that's what you saw them remove from the

A

Yes, and they placed it in the trunk prior to

car?

them taking me away into the patrolman's car.
MR. RENEER:
THE COURT:

That's all.
Mr. Leavitt?

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. LEAVITT:
Q

Mr. Bracero, you were coming up from
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A

Yes.

Q

And you picked the car up and then picked

Mr. Ruiz up and came?
MR. RENEER:

Objection, your Honor.

What is

the relevance of this to a search?
THE COURT:
MR. LEAVITT:

What's the relevance?
Your Honor, I'm just trying to

explore possible impeachment areas.
THE WITNESS:

I'm sorry, I didn't hear.

MR. LEAVITT:

I'm exploring possible

impeachment areas, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Well, I don't think it's

relevant.
MR. LEAVITT:

I certainly have the right to

try to impeach a witness.
MR. RENEER:

I mean, it's relevant at trial,

not here.
THE COURT:

I think he has the right to

impeach him here as well as at trial.

I'm just not

sure I see the relevance of what order he picked up
whom.
MR. LEAVITT:

Well, maybe if you'll give me

five minutes I can try and demonstrate that.
THE COURT:
MR. LEAVITT:

I will allow you a little leeway,
Thank you.
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A

Yes, sir.

Q

Now, there were some cups in the car?

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q

Belonged to your daughter?

A

No.

Q

You heard the officer testify that he thought

they came from your daughter?
A
cups?"
Q

Yes.

When he asked me, "What about those

I said, "They look like kids' cups."
So if the officer testified that you said

they came from your daughter, then you believe that
he's lying?
A

Yeah, it would be my belief that he's lying.

He asked me, "What about those cups?"

And I said,

"They are kids' cups."

I never said, "My daughter's."

Never said, "My kids."

I just said, "They are kid's

cups," because they had drawings of Garfield on them.
Q

Now, the name of the owner -- the name of the

person who owned the vehicle was who?
A

If I recall, Manuel Arroyo.

Q

And he's still a friend of yours?

A

He's not a friend.

Q

He is an acquaintance of yours?

A

Of both, yes.

Q

All right.

He's an acquaintance.

Now, Mr. Bracero, you have been
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2
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11
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United States government?
A

Yes.

Q

Pled guilty to it?

A

Yes.

Q

Served eight months confinement?

A

Yes.

Q

And you were dishonorably discharged for bad

conduct?
A

Not dishonorably discharged, no. I was not.

Q

You were discharged?

A

I was discharged but not dishonorably.

Q

Honorably?

A

No, not honorably.

They called it a bad

conduct discharge which is not a dishonorable.
Dishonorable is much worse.
Q

Nevertheless, you were convicted of fraud

against the United States government?
A

Yes, I was.

Q

Which basically is you lied to benefit

yourself?
A

Excuse me, sir?

Q

You lied to benefit yourself?

A

Well, it wasn't really lying to benefit

myself.

That case was not something that -- was

something personal as far as something that was for me
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this case?
A

Would it benefit me?

Q

Uh-huh (affirmative).

A

I would assume, yes.

I wouldn't be

incarcerated so I guess it would be a benefit, yes.
Q

And you have a demonstrated history of lying

when it benefits someone or yourself; is that right?
A

No, I don't

—

MR. RENEER:

Objection, that's not -- he did

not say he was benefitting himself.

He said

specifically he was benefitting someone else.
THE COURT:

Well, I think the question was

rephrased to say that.
You may answer the question.
THE WITNESS:

Can you repeat the question,

please?
Q

(By Mr. Leavitt)

You have a demonstrated

history of lying to benefit yourself or another
person?
MR. RENEER:

It's not a history.

That was

that one time that it had happened.
Q

And it did, in fact, happen then, is that

right?
A

At that time, yes, it did.

Q

So it is a history; is that right?
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him because he had told me to come go with him so I
went with him to drive.
Q

Why else did you go with him?

A

Well, I wasn't -- at that time I was off a

few days and he invited me to go and we went.
MR. HUNT:

Your Honor, we object again to

this line of questioning.

We didn't bring anything in

on direct where he came from, where he was going, why
he was going there.

And this is a suppression hearing

about whether the search was correct.
irrelevant to the issue today.

This is

It may be relevant at

trial.
MR. LEAVITT:
THE COURT:
Q

I will move on, your Honor.
Thank you.

(By Mr. Leavitt)

Sustained.

Now, Mr. Bracero, I

suppose you didn't have the speedometer calibrated
before you left?
A

Calibrated?

You mean checked?

Q

That's right.

A

No.

Q

You have no knowledge as to whether it

functions properly?
A

Well, firsthand, no, but I had passed

numerous state troopers in the various states and
always doing 75 and they never stopped me for doing no
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Q

And you gave it to him?

A

Yes.

I had it on me.

Of course, I handed it

to him.
Q

He ran a check?

A

Well, he first then asked the passenger,

Mr. Ruiz, the same question, asking for his papers.
Mr. Ruiz then handed him his citizenship, and then he
proceeded and went back to his car.
Q

Ran a check, you presume?

A

I presume, yes.

Q

Came back to your car, met you?

A

Halfway.

Q

And then you say he searched your car?

A

Yeah.

Q

This all took probably four minutes?

A

No.

He met me behind the trunk, yes.

Well, actually, I was sitting in the car

for a good, roughly ten minutes before -- ten, fifteen
minute before he called me back out.
to meet him.

And I went out

I was sitting approximately 10 to 15 --

I'm not sure, but it was about that.
MR. LEAVITT:

All right.

That's all I have,

your Honor.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. RENEER:
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MR. LEAVITT:
THE COURT:

All right.
I suppose if he wants to cross on

that he ought to.
MR. LEAVITT:
THE COURT:

I ought to be able to.
You asked him if he went to Idaho

to see friends?
MR. RENEER:

I asked that?

THE COURT:

0h # yes, you did.

MR. LEAVITT:
MR. RENEER:
THE COURT:
MR. HUNT:

I asked that?
No, he asked that.
But they just asked that again.

The witness volunteered that, I

believe, but I don't think -THE COURT:

I think it's fair game for

Mr. Leavitt to cross on matters -MR. RENEER:
THE COURT:
MR. RENEER:
THE COURT:
cross.

That's fine.
-- that the witness volunteers.
That's fine.

It's irrelevant.

And it is beyond the scope of

I really need to -- you need to decide what

you want to do.

If you want to get beyond the scope

of cross I'm going to allow Mr. Leavitt -MR. RENEER:
THE COURT:

Okay.

It was not my intent.

You are beyond the scope of

cross•
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A

I don't know the exact location.

I don't

know the name of the place.
Q

You would be there how long?

A

A few days.
MR. RENEER:

Your Honor, I was under the

impression that we retracted the -- did I open up that
can?
THE COURT:

I think you did.

MR. RENEER:
MR. HUNT:

Okay.
Your Honor, in my recollection of

what happened, Mr. Reneer did not ask anything about
that particularly except that the witness volunteered
at the end of some other question he was on the way to
Idaho, but he said -THE COURT:

I think the witness can open it

up as much as you can open it up.
MR. RENEER:

Well, I would still question its

relevance, the issue before us today.
THE COURT:
Q

Well, overruled.

(By Mr. Leavitt)

And what was your

companion going to be doing in Idaho?
A

I have no idea.

He told me to accompany him

to see some friends of his.
Q

So you're getting in a car that you borrowed?

A

That I borrowed?
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MR. LEAVITT:

I don't have anything further.

That's all.
THE COURT:

You may step down, sir.

More witnesses?
MR. RENEER:

One more.

Defendant Arturo

Ruiz •

ARTURO RUIZ,
called as a witness by the Defense, was duly sworn
and testified as follows:
THE CLERK:

You do solemnly swear the

testimony you shall give in the case now pending
before the court will be the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

Yes.
Please be seated.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. RENEER:
Q

Could you state your name for the record?

A

Arturo Ruiz Busta Monda.

Q

You were a passenger in the car?

A

(In English) Yes.
THE INTERPRETER:
MR. LEAVITT:

Yes.

Might we just proceed in
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English and

. , .. » neeH

probably do this mostl-

English.

THE COURT:
Is that okay with you, Mr. Ruiz?
Q

(By Mr. Reneer)

:

Jovember 14th, the ddy in question?
A
Q

When the officer first

roached the

(Answers made through the interpreter )

10
i

A

12

Q

What did you Lell him?

1

A

j. - m already America uiLizen,

14

Q

And did you give him something to prove that?

1

A

My citizenship.

16

Q

Papers?

1

A

Yeah, it's just the one on the citizenship is

Q

Were you ever asked to produce a driver

21

A

Never.

23

Q

When Mr. Bracero was out of the car behind

18
19
2
ust -- he just asked me f

'• vi'lui l r , wi'ic s1''!! iihli1 lii o b s e r v e w h a t w a s
25

appening?
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A

He just lasted -- when the police called him,

he lasted about two minutes and then he handcuffed
him.
Q

Did you see him handcuffed?

How did you see

him?
THE COURT:

One at a time*

THE WITNESS:

I was as a passenger.

When I

turned around like this on this side at one side of
the trunk, yes, he was there.

He had him there.

Q

(By Mr. Reneer)

Was the trunk open?

A

No, still wasn't.

Q

You were looking over the back window, out

the back window?
A

Yes, yes.
THE COURT:

We have got to go in English or

Spanish.
MR. RENEER:

I'm sorry.

THE INTERPRETER:
MR. RENEER:
Q

I will slow down.

In Spanish?

Let's go ahead in Spanish.

(By Mr. Reneer)

To reiterate then, the

trunk was closed?
A

Yes.

Q

How, then, was the trunk opened?

A

The officer —

front.

the officer came up in the

He grabbed -- he grabbed the keys on the car.
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A
now?"

He told me, "How many pounds are you carrying
I said, "That was in '95 is all."

Then he told

me -Q

I'm sorry.

A

-- he went back to the trunk and brought my

case.

He put it on the side.

He told me to search it

and that it should be opened in front of him.
Q

Did the officer make you aware that he found

any illegal things in your bag?
A

No, nothing.

Q

And he had still not searched -- had he

searched the inside of the car yet?
A

No.

He went -- he told me -- left me there

and told me to stay right here in front.

He went to

the side and started on my side, his search.
MR. RENEER:
MR. LEAVITT:
THE COURT:
MR. RENEER:

That will be all.
No questions, sir.
You may step down, sir.
Your Honor, I would like to ask

that closing argument be made in writing and submit it
to the Court.
MR. LEAVITT:

We've got a little rebuttal,

your Honor.
THE COURT:

Let's go ahead with the rebuttal

evidence.
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Q

Did you hear them make reference to you just

searching the car without consent?
A

Without, yes.

Yes, I heard that from

Mr. Bracero.
Q

Did you ask consent?

A

I did.

After I was invited to search the

vehicle, I did ask, to clarify it.
Q

Did they appear to understand your request?

A

Oh, yes, they were -- Mr. Bracero spoke very

good English.

He understood what I asked and he

consented, yes.
Q

Thank you.
Hearing the testimony about how the trunk got

opened, does it refresh your recollection as to what
happened?
A

Yes .

Q

Could you please tell us specifically what

occurred there.
A

Yes, I did obtain the keys to try and open

the trunk, but I could not open the trunk.
Mr. Bracero instructed me how to open the trunk.

And

he himself opened that for me because there was some
trick to opening the trunk without the key in it.
MR. LEAVITT:

Thank you, nothing further,

your Honor.
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Go ahead, you may answer the question,
THE WITNESS:
MR. RENEER:

No.

I'm going to say no, sir.

That's all.

THE COURT:

You may step down.

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

Thank you.
Defendants wish to have the

matter submitted in writing?
MR. RENEER:

Correct, your Honor.

MR. LEAVITT:
THE COURT:

Your Honor?
Just a minute.

You submitted

your briefs, are you anticipating submitting anything
further?
MR. HUNT:

Nothing other than the arguments

in writing.
THE COURT:

I want to make sure we are all

talking about the same thing.

We are going to expect

the State will supply a response to your motions and
memorandum, then you'll file a written response to
that.
MR. HUNT:
that way.

Well, your Honor, we can proceed

What we had not envisioned -- we had not

received their response from the State at this point,
and we perhaps both could submit our closing arguments
in writing and not even necessarily have to review
each other's closing argument, just based on the
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the nature of the search.
MR. LEAVITT:

Well, correct, the -- I guess

as I see the issues, your Honor, if the State needs to
demonstrate that the officer legally expanded the
scope of the detention and then obtained a valid
consent to search, State isn't pursuing on the theory
that the officer had probable cause to search without
a warrant.

Under the exception of the warrant

requirement is that he obtain a valid consent to
search after he's legally exceeded the scope of the
original detention, and that's the State's theory.
MR. RENEER:

Your Honor, without speaking to

that as it is part of closing, what our position on
that, I would still like to see a response to our
memorandum and then both of us submit our closing
arguments separate to that.

I don't necessarily want

to respond to his response.

You know, just make it

part of our closing.

I'd still like the see their

legal argument.
MR. LEAVITT:
your Honor,

I'll just submit one document,

closing/memorandum.

MR. RENEER:

All right.

Then we can review

that and then give our closing.
MR. LEAVITT:
MR. RENEER:

(Nods head up and down.)
I have no problem with that.
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA)
:
County of McDowell
)

SS.

I, Nora S. Worthen, do certify that I am a
Registered Professional Reporter and a Utah Certified
Shorthand Reporter, and at the time of the above
hearing I was an Official Court Reporter in and for
the State of Utah; that as such reporter I reported
the occasion of the suppression hearing of the
above-entitled matter at the aforesaid time and place,
That the proceeding was reported by me in stenotype,
using computer-aided transcription, realtime
technology, consisting of pages 3 through 96
inclusive.

That the same constitutes a true and

correct transcription of the said proceedings.
That I am not of kin or otherwise associated
with any of the parties herein, or their counsel, and
that I am not interested in the events thereof.
WITNESS my hand at McDowell County, State of
North Carolina, this 3rd day of January, 1999.

Nora S. Worthen, CSR, RPR
Utah License No. 22-106373-7801

NORA S. WORTHEN, RPR, CSR
(828) 652-0318
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FILED .3 r3fJ
Fourth Judicial District Court of
jSab County State, of Uteh
CARMA B. ^MITH. D Cleric

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
JUAB C W T M T V Q T A T F OF UTAH

ST ATP O P UTAH,
CASE NUMBER: 971400222/
97140223

Plaintiff,
vs.

SAMUEL BRACERO,
DATED: MARCH 3, 1998
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH,

RULING

Plaintiff,
THONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE

vs.
ARTURO RUIZ,
Defendant.

This case is before the court on defendants'
obtained incident lu i h ilhi
January .2, .,

Inp

I < nlnn i MI Hi

ns to suppress evidence
i

r the parties submitted their argument on the evidence in

writing by post hearing b;.^i.>. ;iawng reviewed thai '." i.lence \v I I'm h H fi, ' " "
i

*•"g the motions to suppress.
In this case there are three issues to be decided:
a)

b)

was the detention of Bracero and Ruiz proper, and

c)

was the officer justified in searching the defendants' vehicle?
ANALYSIS

a)

Was the traffic stop proper?
It is well established that a peace officer is justified in stopping a vehicle when

the stop is incident to a traffic violation committed in the officer's presence. See,
e.g.. State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994). In the present case, the defendants'
automobile was observed traveling 83 m.p.h. in a 75 m.p.h. zone. The traffic stop for
speeding was appropriate.1
b)

Was the detention of Bracero and Ruiz properf
Turning now to the defendants' detention subsequent to the traffic stop. It is

proper when an officer conducts a traffic stop for an officer to request a driver's
license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation. See,
e.g.. State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In this case Trooper
Metz approached the window of the vehicle and requested a driver's license and the
vehicle registration. Thereafter he returned to his patrol vehicle and conduced a

1

Defendants argue in their motion to suppress that the traffic stop was somehow racially
motivated because the defendants are Hispanic. The facts surrounding the stop do not support this
conclusion. The defendants' car was "painted" with the radar gun long before the officer could have
observed that the two individuals in the car were Hispanic. When the defendants' car passed the
patrol vehicle at speeds above 75 m.p.h., the driver was wearing military style sun glasses and would
not have been easily identifiable as being Hispanic. In this case the patrol car was at mile marker 217
on 1-15 and the stop took place at or near mile marker 219, a distance of roughly two miles. This is
not enough distance to support the suggestion that the peace officer pulled out, did a "U" turn,
accelerated to pursuit speed and tailed the defendants' car for several minutes while observing that the
occupants of the car were Hispanic before pulling them over. I discount the claim that the stop was
racially motivated or that the defendants had been stopped because the fit some sort of profile.
2

computer check from, which he learned that Bracero's driver's license was suspended.
Neither occupant of the vehicle was propei lb lie s intseel to drive the vehicle. I hereafter,
Metz claims to have observed facts which raised his suspicion as to whether
defendants had possession, of contraband

At that point he switched from, a traffic stop

Trooper Metz asserts that the following objective facts supported his decision
(u seek peiiiiis'sitiii iu .undueI 'the search:
a)

he smelled a strong odor of air freshener,

b)

neither occupant of the vehicle was its .:. ^

c)

the plastic panels in the rear of the venire uac enps and did not fit properly,

d)

t h e r e w a s a m a p a n d a cellular t e l e p h o n e i n t h e v e h i c l e ,

e).

I In i i 111 in 11 \ i f i i 11 mini ill II! I i h

f) •

both occupants appeared nervous and Ruiz would not make eye contact w ith

g)

both occupants had prior criminal histories and the passenger had previously

J *>wner,

ni ni ni i I i ' i I n in I i 11 I n I ni I n li in

been convicted of drug trafficking.
I am convinced that not all of these facts were available to Trooper Metz when
he made the decision to search the vehicle. First, he could, not have seen the map and

the seats and not easilj observable from his view outside the vehicle. Second, \\« 1 i„ei i
.ii. k I'd I nil i: mi 1 ,'i Ii

|HM

I'M ii-.' i in I I II11 mini mi nil i \ ill ill mi i i.. 11 I i I ni 11 .ii ni e I \\ ete gap pi d a n d ill in I mil

s e e m p r o p e r l y attached. T h i r d , that the v e h i c l e w a s from out o f state and h e a d e d t o

3

Idaho does not evidence criminal activity. The vehicle was on an interstate highway
which many, many vehicles use to travel from one state to the another, only traveling
through but not staying in Utah. Fourth, the past criminal histories of the two
defendants does not establish that either was involved in criminal activity at this time.
Fifth, nervousness standing alone is not grounds for a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. For differing reasons some of us react with much more nervousness than
others when in the presence of police officers; and many of those reasons have nothing
to do with ongoing criminal activity.
The only facts which I find actually observable by Trooper Metz at the time he
made his decision to detain the vehicle and which support that decision are the smell
of air freshener and the fact that neither occupant was the registered owner of the car.
These are too slim a reed upon which to base the decision to detain the vehicle. That
Bracero thereafter consented to the search does not rescue the search as there has been
no showing that the detention prior to the search was proper.2 I am well aware that in
evaluating the appropriateness of an investigative stop or detention, I must look at the
totality of the circumstances observable to the officer. See United States v. Sokolow.
490 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). While I give credit to the officer because he is out on the
front lines in a serious effort to enforce the laws of the State of Utah3, given all of the

2

Trooper Metz claims that Bracero consented to his search of the vehicle while defendants claim
that Bracero did not give consent. I need not reach this issue as I conclude that the detention prior to
the request for consent to search was improper.
3

Defendants became quite personal in their closing arguments, attacking both Trooper Metz and
his supervisor, Sergeant Paul Mangelson. Though I rule in defendants' favor, I do not adopt that
portion of their brief which impugns the integrity of either officer.
4

evidence received at the hearing, I am not convinced that the officer had reasons'!:
suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify his detention oi the de;-

j ». " *

I grant the motions to suppress. ?...i-..idr.i to Rule 4-504 TTtah Code of Judicial
Administration, defendants
Recognizing that defendants have been in custody for a signi:

*

these charges and that Bracero still faces the charges of driving on suspensiu
speeding, I direct that both defendants be released on their own recognizance and a
promise to appear and that the matters be set for further hearing at an appropriate time.
I

.1 March, 1998.

£<££//j
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Addendum E

FILED IN
STATE OF UTAH
JUAB COUNTY

David 0 . Leavitt, No. 5990
Juab County Attorney
146 North Main
Nephi, Utah 84648
Telephone: (435) 623-1141

98HAR30 PrH:35r£

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
OBJECTION TO ORDER ON
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,

Criminal No. 9714000222
Criminal No. 9714000223

vs.

SAMUEL BRACERO
ARTURORUIZ,
Defendants.

Comes now the State of Utah by and through the Juab County Attorney and hereby
objects to the defendant's Order On Motion To Suppress and asks that the court set the matter for
hearing.
Dated this

?0^

day of March, 1998.

Da^dO. Leavitt
Juab County Attorney
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Objection to Order On Motion To
Suppress to Jere Reneer, Attorney for Defendants, 275 North Main, P. O. Box 298, Spanish
Fork, Utah 84660 on this ZrU. day of March, 1998.

BY C^/.^^.<^/-A>-

x'fT^y s_;^

FILED IN
UTH DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH
JUA5 COUNTY

David O. Leavitt, No. 5990
Juab County Attorney
146 North Main
Nephi, Utah 84648
Telephone: (435) 623-1141
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE
GRANTING OF SUPPRESSION
MOTION

Plaintiff,
vs.

Criminal No. 9714000222
9714000223

SAMUEL BRACERO
ARTURO RUIZ,
Defendants.

The State of Utah hereby request the Court to reconsider it's granting of the defense
Motion to Suppress for the reasons set forth in its Memorandum in Support of its Motion to
Suppress which has been filed with the court.
Dated this &~^

day of April, 1998.

David O. Leavitt
Juab County Attorney

FILED IN
UTH DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH
JUA5COUNTY

98APR2*PrU:33

David O. Leavitt, No. 5990
Juab County Attorney
146 North Main
Nephi, Utah 84648
Telephone: (435) 623-1141

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF ITS MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Plaintiff,
vs.

Criminal No. 9714000222
9714000223

SAMUEL BRACERO
ARTURO RUIZ,
Defendants.

The State of Utah hereby submits the following Memorandum in Support of its Motion to
Reconsider.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The State takes the following relevant facts from the court's ruling filed the 3rd day of
March, 1998. "Trooper Metz approached the window of the vehicle and requested a driver's
license and vehicle registration. Thereafter he returned to his patrol vehicle and conducted a
computer check from which he learned that Bracero's driver's license was suspended. Neither
occupant of the vehicle was properly licensed to drive the vehicle." (Ruling on Suppression

1

Motion, pages 2 and 3.)
ARGUMENT
Trooper Metz was statutorily authorized to conduct a search incident to arrest at the time
that he learned that the defendant was driving on a suspended license.
Although the court decided this issue originally as a scope of detention issue, the issue
really constitutes a question as to whether the trooper could have arrested the driver for driving
on a suspended license. Indeed, there is no scope of detention issue in this case because prior to
that issue arising, the trooper could have arrested the defendant. Trooper Metz was authorized to
request a driver's license. Seet e.g, State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991) (following a
justifiable traffic stop, an officer may request to see the driver's license and registration, conduct
a computer check and issue a citation.) The result of the request for a license was that the trooper
learned that the defendant driver had a suspended license. In light of this fact, the pertinent
inquiry becomes not whether the trooper had reasonable suspicion for further investigation, but
whether the defendant's failure to drive with a valid license constituted probably cause for his
arrest. See e.g. State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 669) (Utah App. 1991) (holding warrantless
arrest proper if "from the facts known to the officer, and inferences which fairly might be drawn
therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in his position might be justified in believing a
suspect had committed the offense" (quoting State v. Hatcher, 495 P.2d 1259,1260 (1972))),
cert, denied 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah, 1992). Incident to a lawful arrest, police are entitled to search
the area within the arrestee's immediate control, including the arrestee's vehicle. New York v.
2

Belton, 453 U.S. 454,460-461 (1981) (holding that following a lawful arrest police may search
the passenger compartment of the arrestee's automobile and also examine the contents of any
containers found therein); State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245,1248 (Utah App. 1996).
The pertinent Fourth Amendment inquiry is not whether the trooper subjectively intended
to arrest the defendant, but whether objectively he could have arrested the defendant. State v.
Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1206 (Utah, 1995) (rejecting "pretext arrest" analysis and holding that
"the validity of an arrest must be analyzed on objective criteria, not an officer's subjective
motivation or suspicions.") See also Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978) (rejecting
subjective inquiry for Fourth Amendment purposes: "The fact that the officer does not have the
state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the
officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed
objectively, justify that action."). Consequently it is simply irrelevant whether the trooper
subjectively intended to arrest the defendant at precisely the same moment he was objectively
entitled to do so. In Harmon, the Utah Supreme Court further found that an arrest for driving on
a suspended license was both statutorily authorized and constitutionally reasonable. 910 P.2d
1199-1204. This case nearly mirrors the decision by the Utah Court of Appeals in State vs.
Alires, Utah Court of Appeals Case No. 960259-CA. Alires is a memorandum decision, not
published. In Alires the defendant raised the issue as to whether the vehicle search was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Court held "that in the spirit of Harmon the
defendant's arrest was statutorily authorized and constitutionally reasonable
3

and the

officer's subjective intent is irrelevant to our inquiry." The State attaches as Exhibit 1 to it's
Memorandum in Support a photocopy of the Memorandum Decision in State vs. Alires.
CONCLUSION
Because the officer was statutorily authorized to arrest the defendant for driving on
suspension, his search of the vehicle was valid as a search incident to arrest, regardless of
whether his subjective intent was to arrest the defendant for driving on suspension at the exact
time he learned of the offense. Therefore, the scope of the detention was not improperly
exceeded. For that reason, the State of Utah hereby requests the Court to change it's ruling and
deny the motion to suppress.
Dated this 22*4

day of

jfyO/\l

, 1998.

CUa.

David O. Leavitt
Juab County Attorney

I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Reconsider to Jere Reneer, Attorney for Defendants, 275 North Main, P. O. Box 298, Spanish
Fork, Utah 84660 on this JJnd
day of April, 1998.

BY £J^^^2£s

y^L^j^

SENT BY:
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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State of Utah,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 960259-CA

Deano R. Alires,
Defendant and Appellant.

F I L E D
(March 3 , 1998)

Third District, Salt Lake Department, Division I
The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis
Attorneyss

Robert K. Heineroan and Richard P, Maurof Salt Lake
City, for Appellant
Jan Graham and Marian Decker, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee

Before Judges Wilkins, Greenwood, and Jackson•
WILKINS, Associate Presiding Judge:
Defendant Deano R. Alires raises two issues on appeal: (1)
Whether the officer's questioning concerning possible weapons and
contraband and request for consent to search unconstitutionally
exceeded the scope of the traffic stop; and (2) Whether the
vehicle search wae reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Because we conclude the search to have been constitutional as it
was incident to defendant's arrest for driving on a suspended
license, £££ State v. Harmon. 910 P.2d 1196, 1201 (Utah 1995), we
need not address whether the questions asked or the request for
consent to search were beyond the scepe of the initial traffic
stop.
As in State v. y&rmen. defendant here could not produce a
valid driver's license or evidence of entitlement to use the
vehicle* His "offense of driving on suspension is different
from, for example, speeding, because allowing [him] to 'proceed
on this] way' without a valid license permits the continuation of
[his] unlawful activity." See id. at 1204. Therefore, we
conclude that defendant's arrest was reasonable.

9

The trial court found that defendant: hari prehired a driver's
license, but that he had also informed the officer that it was
suspended. At that point, defendant's arrest was statutorily
authorized and constitutionally reasonable, see id. at 1201,
1204, and the officer's subjective intent 15 irrelevant to our
inquiry, see id. at 1204-06. Based on the evidence presented at
the suppression hearing, the trial court found that the search
was substantially contenporaneous with defendant's arrest, we
are not convinced that such a finding is clearly erroneous, and
as such affirm the trial court's legal conclusion that the search
of the vehicle was constitutionally permissible.
Affirmed.

Michael J. Wilkms,
Associate Presiding Judge

WE CONCUR:

Famela T. Greenwooa, Judge

NcGrman H. JacksgGf,

960259-CA

Judge
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Addendum F

FILED IN
U7H DISTRICT COURT
S T A T E OF U T A H

J.J AS COUNTY
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Jere Reneer (7967)
HUNT & RENEER, P.C.
275 North Main
PO Box 298
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660
(801) 798-3574
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT FOR JUAB COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SAMUEL BRACERO,
and

Case Nos.9714000222 & 9714000223
ARTURO RUIZ,
Judge: Anthony Schofield

Defendants.

COMES NOW, the above named defendants, by and through their attorney of
record, Jere Reneer of HUNT & RENEER, P.C, and submits the following Memorandum
in Opposition to Plaintiff s Motion to Reconsider.
FACTS
The relevant facts are as follows:

1.

Defendants were pulled over for speeding by Officer Metz. The driver,

Sam Bracero, produced a California Driver's License and valid registration. Unknown to
Mr. Bracero, the license was suspended.
2.

The passenger, Arturo Ruiz, was also asked to produce identification and

he provided his Certificate of United States Citizenship.
3.

After a computer check on the defendants, Officer Metz informed Bracero

that his license was suspended, to which Bracero plead ignorance. Metz spoke with
Bracero about the defendants criminal histories. Metz asked if there were drugs or
weapons in the car. Bracero replied that there was not.
4.

Metz told Bracero to put his hands behind his back, informing him that he

was not under arrest, but merely being detained so he would not run while Metz searched
the vehicle.
5.

Metz testified that at no time did he ask Ruiz if he had a valid license to

operate the vehicle.
6.

Metz started his search by opening and searching the contents of the trunk

of the defendants vehicle.
7.

Metz testified at the suppression hearing that his normal procedure for

dealing with a suspended license is to issue a citation and promise to appear, and to let the
driver go.

2

8.

Officer Mangelson, who arrived on the scene of the search 30 minutes after

it had been instituted by Metz, found contraband in the defendants' vehicle.
9.

Only then, were the defendants placed under arrest.
ARGUMENT

Plaintiff has tried to re-characterize the nature of the case against defendants from
probable cause to that of a search incident to arrest. However, there is no bases in the
facts of the case against defendants to support such a change in analysis and defendants
urge the Court to deny plaintiffs Motion to reconsider.
The main hurdle the plaintiff fails to overcome is the fact that defendants were not
ever arrested until after contraband was found. Probable cause to arrest is not the same as
probable cause to search, they are different analysis for different situations.
All of plaintiffs analysis wrongly focuses on whether Metz had the objective facts
on which to arrest defendants and then, incident to the arrest, search defendants and the
area immediately within the arrestee's control. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460461 (1981)(holding that following a lawful arrest police may search the passenger
compartment of the arrestee's automobile and also examine the contents of any containers
found therein)(quoting plaintiffs synopsis, pg. 3 of Motion to reconsider). But, an arrest
was not made prior to the search, and thefirstplace Metz looked was in the trunk of the
vehicle, not the passenger compartment. Belton, does not apply.

3

Plaintiff summarizes State v. Harmon. 910P.2d 1196, 1206 (Utah 1996), stating
that "pretext arrest" analysis has been rejected and quoting, "the validity of an arrest must
be analyzed on objective criteria, not an officer's subjective motivation or suspicions."
Again, no arrest had been made at the time during the search where plaintiffs try to apply
this doctrine.
It is irrelevant that Harmon also ruled arrest for driving on a suspended license was
both statutorily authorized and constitutional. No arrest was made for driving under
suspension and therefore, no search could be authorized by a non-existent arrest.
State v. Alires. Utah Court of Appeals Case No. 960259-CA, does no more to
help plaintiffs argument than the rest, and does not remotely resemble the present matter
despite plaintiffs urging. AHres, see copy attached to plaintiffs Motion onfilewith the
Court, is yet another instance where the defendant had already been arrested when he was
asked for consent to search his vehicle. As a search incident to an arrest, of course the
search in Alires would be constitutional. Nevertheless, in the matter before this Court,
there was no arrest made at the time defendants were detained and asked for consent to
search their vehicle. Alires, does not apply.
It has already been shown repeatedly by defendants' presentation at the
suppression hearing, Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress and Closing
Arguments that Metz had no intention of arresting defendants for any reason until after
contraband was found in their vehicle, and therefore, there is no way to conclude that the

4

search of defendants' vehicle was at all contemporaneous with their arrest. The court
correctly analyzed this matter under scope of detention parameters and the order to
suppress must stand.
Wherefore the defendants pray the Court deny plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider.
DATED this

7tL^

ST^^day of May, 1998.

fe

Reneer
JT & RENEER, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
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Addendum G

Fw-.th Judicial District Court of
Juab County, State of Utah
CARMA BA SMITH, Clerk
(AVn
Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff

CASE NUMBER: 971400222/
97140223

vs.
SAMUEL BRACERO,
DATED: MAY 22, 1998
Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH,

RULING

Plaintiff;
vs.

ANTHONY W. SCHOFTELD, JUDGE

ARTURORUIZ,
Defendant.
This case is before the Court pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial
Administration, on the State's motion to reconsider.
On March 3, 1998,1 issued a ruling granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence
obtained incident to a traffic stop. Thereafter, the Statefileda motion to reconsider on April 22,
1998, followed by defendant's memorandum in oppositionfiledon May 11, 1998. Having
received and reviewed the memoranda, I deny the State's motion to reconsider.
Pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, the State is directed to
prepare an appropriate order.
!

Dated this Z^dav of May, 1998.

BY THE COURT:

W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE

"A « & *

* - ^
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Addendum H

FILED § W ^ £
Fourth Judicial District Court of
Juab County, State of Utah
CARMA B. SMITH, Clerk

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

¥£&

<

Deputy

CASE NUMBER:
971400222/971400223

Plaintiff,
vs.

DATED: AUGUST 14,1998

SAMUEL BRACERO
ARTURO RUIZ,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Defendants.
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE

The above entitled matter having come before the above entitled Court on defendants'
Motion to Suppress. The State was represented by David O. Leavitt, Juab County Attorney, and
the defendants were represented by Jere Reneer, attorney for the defendants. After hearing the
evidence and reviewing the memorandafiledby counsel. The Court makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On November 14, 1997, Trooper Hoby Metz of the Utah Highway Patrol, stopped a
1989 Ford Tempo for traveling 83 m .p.h. in a 75 m.p.h. zone.
2. The driver of the vehicle was Samuel Enrique Bracero. Arturo Ruiz was a passenger
in the vehicle.
3. Upon approaching the vehicle, Trooper Metz testified he detected a strong odor of air
fresheners and could see the airfresheneron the console.
1

4. The defendants were traveling from California and going to Idaho.
5. Trooper Metz returned to his patrol car and conducted criminal history and driver's
license requests on the two occupants of the vehicle. Both occupants had prior criminal histories
and the passenger previously had been arrested for drug smuggling.
6. The driver had a suspended license. Neither occupant could legally operate the vehicle.
7. The driver and passenger appeared nervous and would not make eye contact with the
officer.
8. Because he suspected that driver and passenger were involved in drug trafficking, the
officer asked for consent to search the vehicle.
9. The defendants consented to the search.
10. A search of the vehicle revealed 17 packages of marijuana weighing approximately 31
pounds in the side rear panels of the vehicle behind the moldings the officer had observed.
11. At the time the officer asked for permission to search he had certain facts in his mind
which he felt justifed continued detention of the defendants. Regarding these facts, I find as
follows:
A. Trooper Metz could not have seen the map of cell phone when he looked in the
car since they were located between the seat and the console of the car. The map nor cell phone
would not by itself be evidence of criminal activity.
B. Trooper Metz explained that the molding in the rear part of the car appeared
altered. On cross examination, however, he could not explain which panels were gapped and did
not seem properly attached. Thus his recollection of the event was too tenuous upon which to
base a continued detention. Ill-fitting molding would not by itself be evidence of criminal activity.

2

C. An out-of-state car headed to Idaho does not, by itself, evidence criminal
activity.
D. The nervousness of the defendants does not justify further detention nor, by
itself, is it evidence of criminal activity.
E. The airfreshenersmell does not justify further detention. The smell of air
freshener, by itself, does not evidence criminal activity.
F.

The fact that neither occupant of the vehicle was the registered owner does

not warrant a detention beyond that of traffic stop nor by itself does it evidence criminal activity.
12. The State filed a Motion to Reconsider based upon State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196
(Utah, 1995) and also State v. Alires, 960259 CA, (Ut. App. 3-3-98) which held that driving on
suspension is an arrestable offense.
13. The Court denied the Motion to Reconsider without comment.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
1. The Court finds that the Trooper Metz's initial stop of the vehicle was justified.
2. The officer lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify his
detention of the defendants past the original traffic stop.
3. The defendants consented to the search of the vehicle but that search was tainted by
the already existing illegal detention.
4. The Court therefore grants the motion to suppress.
Dated this J±L day of August, 1998.

*V

>

'

'

ANTHONY W. SCHOFI^LD, JUDGE

